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Abstract 
 
The following sketch attempts to look at the ways in which Francis Bacon helped 
to bring about the modern age by presenting a system of skepticism, in the form 
of his doctrine of idols, which initiated the break away from classical philosophy 
and Christian theology and made room for a new, secular science. By looking at 
Bacon’s peculiar and esoteric writing style as well as his detractors’ assessments 
of him, I show not only what they got wrong about Bacon but also and more 
importantly that many of their criticisms of Bacon’s role in the history of science 
and philosophy depend on his very success in brining about a reformation of 
men’s minds. I show how far-reaching his doctrine of the idols is and how it 
initiated the trend in modern philosophy to create systems of skepticisms that are 
based on human reason’s self-criticism. Finally, I show how Bacon’s doctrine of 
idols led to his refutations not only of philosophical doctrines but of Christian 
theology as well. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present study attempts to outline some of the ways in which Francis Bacon 
breaks away from classical and scholastic thinkers and helps put the Western 
World, and subsequently the entire world, on the path of scientific and intellectual 
enlightenment. Bacon was the first to postulate the idea that human knowledge 
and power the same thing. To address the possible pernicious consequences of 
a world in which human beings continually exert more power over nature, Bacon 
justifies the project with this promise: an increase in knowledge leads to an 
increase in happiness through the improvement of life.  
That we are all children of the modern age is not in dispute; and this age, 
although no longer in its infancy, has come to dominate the minds, bodies, and 
souls of human beings. The idea of technological progress no longer astounds 
us. By and large, we have come to view human progress as coincident with the 
progression of time itself. This leads to the tendency to think of the new as the 
better—the improved. This tendency is especially evident in scientific enterprises. 
When one speaks of the future of medicine, for example, one has in mind new 
cures, new medical technologies, new ways to identify medical conditions, and in 
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general, new and better means of helping people. In sum, we understand 
progress as the gradual improvement of the human condition.  
But how do we now understand Bacon’s proposition that knowledge is 
power? He tells us that the “force, virtue, and consequences of what has been 
discovered…is nowhere more apparent than in…the Art of Printing, Gunpowder, 
and the Mariner’s Compass.”1 Clearly, each of these discoveries helps to expand 
human power. The first creates an easier way to disseminate thought. The third 
promotes the extension of human empire. But the discovery of gunpowder does 
not clearly lead to an improvement of human life; in fact, by providing more 
effective means of destroying life, the discovery of gunpowder seems to have 
increased our capacity, not to improve, but to worsen life. We often forget this 
pernicious aspect of progress. Do we delude ourselves in thinking that scientific 
progress exclusively alleviates human ills, and consequently, always improves 
human life? Are we blind to the fact that this same progress may create new ills? 
Or, is it that we are so taken by the goods and inventions of the scientific 
progress that its evils no longer trouble us? The fact that the possibility of the 
technological annihilation of the world no longer principally worries us suggests 
either that we believe resisting progress is futile or that the benefits of our 
innovations have desensitized us to their (potential) evils. In speaking of “the 
machine,” George Orwell offers the following acute analysis from the Road to 
Wigan Pier: 
The sensitive person’s hostility to the machine is in one sense unrealistic, 
because of the obvious fact that the machine has come to stay. But as an 
attitude of mind there is a great deal to be said for it. That machine has 
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got to be accepted, but it is probably better to accept it rather as one 
accepts a drug—that is, grudgingly and suspiciously. Like a drug, the 
machine is useful, dangerous and habit-forming. The oftener one 
surrenders to it the tighter its grip becomes. You have only to look about 
you at this moment to realize with what sinister speed the machine is 
getting us into its power.2  
 
However prophetic this sentiment appears to us presently, the “machine” of today 
grips us tighter, reaches far more, and holds greater power over us than Orwell 
could have imagined. We are again reminded that knowledge is power and that 
the result is ambiguous.  
Why must we look to Bacon above others? Descartes, for example, is 
generally thought to be the first of the moderns. However, this opinion comes 
from two distinct, but related, tracks of thinking. The first is that Descartes’s 
contributions to modern mathematics, optics, and more generally, physics are 
representative of the kinds of works of modern science. According to Carl Page, 
the second is that Descartes fundamentally altered the landscape of physics and 
metaphysics: “[w]hat is first in philosophy is no longer what is first in the order of 
being but what is first in the order of knowing.”3 Page finds that Descartes’s 
“subversion on behalf of his physics” is what is especially modern. Furthermore, 
he tells us that Descartes’s “intensely single-minded, even jealous advocacy 
commends itself to all but the most stubborn antiquarian mentality as modernity’s 
almost perfect philosophical representative.”4 However, our study is concerned 
with the breaking away from the grips of antiquity. Our mentality, antiquarian as it 
may be, is that Descartes already inhabited a distinctly modern world, and this 
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world first articulated fully by Francis Bacon as a philosophical movement in 
rebellion from much of the intellectual-political-religious world.   
It is true that Bacon’s reputation, especially with regard to his contributions 
to the modern project, has been significantly diminished. Graham Rees tells us 
that during the seventeenth century  
Bacon’s words were on everyone’s lips, though not always fixed in their 
understandings. His writings were invoked by all sorts and conditions of 
individuals: virtuosi on the make, provincial projectors, improving 
colonialists, millenarian visionaries, Royalists and radicals, Anglicans and 
Puritans, Calvinists and Latitudinarians, educational and social reformers, 
promoters of the New Science and defenders of the Old Erudition. The 
celebrities of the Royal Society were seemingly as keen to associate 
themselves with Bacon’s program as was the host of lesser figures who, 
as self-interest or philanthropy prompted, flocked to the noble but 
amorphous banner of the Experimental Philosophy.5 
 
But it soon became “commonplace to ridicule Bacon’s philosophy and criticize his 
moral outlook.”6 And on the whole, this trend does not seem to be letting up. 
Robert Faulkner tells us that even recent scholars “depreciate Bacon’s originality 
and historical influence.”7 Faulkner, however, finds that Bacon’s “ultimate ideas 
prove to be not commonplace but profound, and those who depreciate Bacon 
often remain entangled in some aspect of the state of mind (italics mine) that he 
inaugurated.”8 In this vein, Laurence Lampert supposes that Bacon’s reputation 
may have “fallen victim to [Bacon’s] own success.”9 David Stove, however, gives 
an account of a very different kind. He agrees, for instance, that Bacon’s 
utilitarian conception of the scientific project is identical to the one we have today: 
the promise of science is to improve human life through the increase of 
knowledge; this increase leads to new applications; and these applications 
! 5!
increase human happiness through their use in the improvements to human 
life.10  But Stove finds that, until the past century, science had “never once 
brought up any marked increase in human happiness”; and this “simple historical 
fact is enough on its own to refute the Enlightenment delusions of Bacon.”11  
However, even if we accept Lampert’s contention that Bacon’s success is 
the cause of his fallen reputation, then it is still unclear what helps Bacon could 
provide us today: the progeny of his project no longer find him relevant. Must we 
then content ourselves, not with contemporary scientists and innovators, but with 
historians of scientific and intellectual history? Also, even in the history and the 
philosophy of science, we find the same divide that Faulkner speaks of regarding 
Baconian scholars. The seemingly rigid dichotomy between admirers and 
detractors of Bacon is not a new phenomenon. Dana Jalobeanu draws attention 
to historian Stephen Beasley Linnard Penrose’s summary of the peculiarity of 
Baconian scholarship:  
Few philosophers have suffered greater variation in the reputation which 
has been theirs throughout the history of modern philosophy than has 
Francis Bacon. Carried by eighteenth century thought to a commanding 
position as the ‘greatest, the most universal, and the most eloquent of 
philosophers’ he was plunged in the nineteenth century to the despicable 
status of a man whose scientific method was never used by any real 
scientist, whose effect upon the advancement of science was, if anything, 
detrimental. From one point of view he was the first really great modern 
moralist; form another he was a contemptible schemer whose ethical 
advice had been best left unpublished. He was a staunch adherent of the 
Christian faith, who strengthened the hold of religion on the hearts of 
men; and he was a damnable atheist whose very effort was aimed at 
undermining all religion. He was personally a man of stainless character 
who was sacrificed for the misdeed of others; and he was a treacherous 
designer, corrupt, immoral, ‘the meanest of mankind.’ He wrote beautiful 
English and admirable Latin; and his English style was stiff and pedantic, 
while he ‘knew no Latin.’ The only philosopher who could come close to 
being favorably compared to him was Aristotle, or Plato; and yet there 
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were few men in the history of philosophy who had not made a greater 
contribution to knowledge than had Bacon.12 
 
The character of Bacon’s reception is indeed unique. And as we see in Chapter 
Two, the more modern science, and specifically modern physics, expanded into, 
and permeated through, many aspects of human life, the more Bacon’s 
reputation continued to atrophy. Current studies of Baconian scholarship “have a 
somewhat marginal status,” and even works that feature Bacon prominently treat 
him as “a key figure in all sorts of historical revisionisms.”13  
Jalobeanu implies that the authors of these historical “revisionisms” do not 
feature Bacon so that they can reevaluate aspects of his philosophy. Instead, 
they utilize his philosophy to further their own revisionist theories and histories—
in other words, their own agendas. Apart from a limited (albeit growing) number 
of Baconian scholars who take his work seriously, revisionist academics instead 
have forced him to play the leading role in the theater of historiography as they 
rewrite the history of the world from the drawing boards of their idiosyncratic 
imaginings.  
Instead of adulterating Bacon’s philosophy so that it fits a certain agenda, 
some thinkers—and prominent ones to boot—tend to ignore or dismiss Bacon 
altogether. Martin Heidegger, one of the 20th century’s preeminent thinkers—
especially with regard to his thoughts concerning modernity—fails to address 
Bacon directly. According to Heidegger, the world picture “does not change from 
an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world 
becomes a picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age.”14 
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But the lack of any mention of Bacon indicates that Heidegger finds Bacon’s work 
irrelevant or inconsequential to an understanding of the modern age. And yet, 
Leo Strauss finds the most complete expression of the “systematic 
transformation of philosophic interest, which brought about the turning to 
history…in Bacon’s philosophy.”15 Heidegger also points to the turning to history 
as being essential to the modern age, but he does not credit Bacon for the turn. 
This is not to say that we must cast aside those who likewise cast aside Bacon, 
and only look to Bacon’s admirers and supporters.16 It is to say, however, that 
even in works like “The Age of the World Picture,” which fail to address Bacon 
directly, Bacon’s words, works, and influence seem to be present.  
To restrict the purview of this study, we chiefly look to the role that the 
New Organon has played in the demotion of philosophy, the reformation of the 
mind of man, the development and augmentation of the scientific project, and the 
metamorphosis of nature from a creative and controlling force to the object of 
man’s dominion. We follow the idea that Bacon’s reformation of an entire 
worldview, his turning to history, his “project of progress,” involves not merely a 
scientific point of view (with respect to contributions in research) but a view of the 
whole. We must understand what Bacon turned away from, and it is the 
contention of this study that Bacon’s contributions are only brought to light by 
looking at the whole—not merely pieces of his cosmology, his histories, his 
theory of light, and so on. Moreover, it is for this thesis to prove that Bacon’s 
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vision for the world has become the reality of our world. What he saw as the 
potency of human civilization has come to fruition.  
In Chapter Two, we attempt to provide a preliminary sketch of some of 
Bacon’s peculiarities. The chapter first introduces Bacon’s style of writing; and 
then it looks at common interpretations and misinterpretations of his works. 
Critics of Bacon tend to misrepresent Bacon’s thought and misconstrue his 
words. Often, these errors stem from selective interpretations of Bacon, 
downright bastardizations of his thought, or the tendency of critics to avoid 
reading Bacon altogether. Some of these mistakes are intentional: authors 
advance their own agendas in the history of science and philosophy; and 
because Bacon happens to be a seminal figure in this history, he figures in their 
histories. However, others are products of Bacon’s peculiar writing style; some 
consider Bacon to be the “last representative of a traditional ‘esoteric’ culture.”17  
This “culture” creates a fundamental difficulty in reading Bacon: his “views 
are not simply exposed to view, but become accessible only to a certain art of 
interpretation.”18 We explore the question of how to read Bacon in the first part of 
Chapter Two. We see that misreading Bacon not only leads to mischaracterizing 
his thoughts, but also deepens the depreciation of Bacon as a thinker and his 
role in the history of science. The second part of Chapter Two offers an overview 
of various detractors of Bacon and his influence. We examine three main 
criticisms of Bacon. The first claim is that Bacon distrusted or disliked 
mathematics; because of modern science’s reliance on mathematics, detractors 
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either claim that Bacon simply cannot be said to have had much of an influence 
on the history of modern science or that his influence is merely rhetorical, and 
therefore, superficial. The second claim is that Bacon was suspicious of the roles 
that hypothesis and theory have in scientific procedure; they contend that such a 
lack of foresight proves that his entire understanding of how science proceeds is 
faulty; he, thus, neither contributed to the project nor influenced those who did. 
The third depreciation of Bacon is that he merely supplied the rhetoric, the 
prophetic vision, of the project.  
That we live in a modern age and that modernity has a special character 
to it are not generally questioned. The means as to how we inherited this 
character, not simply of residing in a technological age but of how we came to 
regard our age as fundamentally different from previous ages, occupies our time 
in Chapter Three. Accordingly, we attempt to show that the first step of Bacon’s 
instauration is destructive; its goal is to draw man’s attention to the deficiencies of 
the natural human intellect, and to purge the mind of its adherence to the deeply 
flawed philosophical and theological sects. He calls his first one hundred and 
fifteen aphorisms of Book One, “the destructive part.”19 And in his Plan of the 
Work, Bacon lets us know that “since men’s minds are so marvelously beset that 
they altogether lack a clear and polished surface to focus the true rays of things,” 
he is “obliged to find a remedy for this too.”20 Because the human intellect is not 
like a clean and flat slate, Bacon either must help us eradiate the extrinsic idols of 
the human mind, or alert us to their perniciousness.  
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There are four idols of the human mind. Idols of the tribe are built into the 
very tribe or race of men and originate from “the human spirit, or from its 
preconceptions, its narrowness, its restlessness, contamination by the affections, 
the inadequacy of the senses, or mode of impression.” 21  The second 
classification of idols, the idols of the cave, are idiosyncratic, and as such, 
“originate from the peculiar nature of the individual, both body and soul, as well 
as from education, custom and accident.”22 Idols of the market are the third kind 
of idols. They develop through the “alliance of words and names,” and are the 
“greatest nuisances of the lot”; in some cases, words and names confuse the 
mind into thinking that they refer to something real; this leads to disputes over 
words—not things—because the mind tends to reify words. The idols of the 
theatre comprise the final class of idols. They enter the mind (and are, therefore, 
not innate) through philosophical and theological doctrines as well as through the 
“misguided laws of demonstration.”23  
Chapter Four, while still concerning the “destructive part,” turns to some of 
Bacon’s new “hopes.” He juxtaposes these hopes with the false promises given 
by philosophies and theologies. Accordingly, we begin to see that the New 
Organon is not merely a book of science or method; it is a displacement of the 
past, a reformation of thought, and a revolution in the way human beings think 
not only about the world, but also about themselves. It is in this part of the study 
that we look at Bacon’s refutations of the philosophies and theologies that 
comprise the idols of the market. We see that it was Socrates, a philosopher 
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without a school or works, who was responsible for turning men’s eyes away 
from nature and towards themselves. In other words, the turn to moral and 
political things was the great mistake of philosophy. Accordingly at the end of 
Book One, Bacon proclaims that his method is to be followed not only in natural 
philosophy, but also—and most strikingly—in “logic, ethics, and politics.”24 This 
disclosure reveals the comprehensive praxis of the new method; the essence of 
the project and the application of the method are comprehensive.  
To grasp fully Bacon’s particularly modern approach to the acquisition of 
new knowledge, we must approach his works on his terms. His erudition is of the 
classical tradition, yet, he desires to raze this tradition to the ground. He is the 
architect of a new edifice, but he never saw its implementation or its completion 
(if it can ever be completed). He is man of the past, but the leader of the new. We 
must look to Bacon to understand him—not to those who simply took up the 
reigns to his project. Bacon reared and broke the horse, but he did so without a 
guarantee of success.   
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Chapter Two 
Reading Bacon on His Terms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We seek to form an introduction to Bacon’s peculiar writing style in the first part 
of this chapter. Besides the inherent difficulty of reading aphorisms—they are 
purposely laconic—Bacon’s own admissions as to what he says, and most 
importantly, what he does not say increase the likelihood of differing, contrasting, 
or simply incompatible interpretations. These difficulties are compounded by the 
fact that in this modern age, we seek clarity and exactitude. However, Heidegger 
tells us that the “rigor of mathematical physical science is exactitude,” yet, the 
“humanistic sciences, in contrast, indeed all the sciences concerned with life, 
must necessarily be inexact just in order to remain rigorous.”1  
However, a symptom of the modern age is to depreciate inexactitude and 
appreciate exactitude both in the physical and humanistic sciences. Modern 
readers face the deepest difficulty with obscure writing because they are familiar 
with the modern form of writing. Similarly, scientifically versed readers of Bacon 
must ask how he could be considered one of the founders of modern science if 
his writing embodies none of the characteristics essential to the activity and 
description of modern science. Modern science demands clarity and exactitude. 
Writings that are unclear, inexact, or purposely hard to follow are already at a 
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disadvantage when confronted by modern man. With the inexact, there is 
uncertainty; and with uncertainty, there is dismissiveness. In the second part, we 
look to some of Bacon’s detractors and their purported criticisms of his thought. 
Although we might attribute some of these misinterpretations to the inherent 
difficulties of reading Bacon, others are either a product of avoiding Bacon’s texts 
altogether or misconstruing them so that Bacon fits into some predetermined 
place in their narratives.  
 
 
 
 
Eloquence in Silence 
 
In the period from 1602-1609, Bacon started working on five works that remain 
unfinished and completed four works: Thoughts and Conclusions, the Refutations 
of Philosophies, the Advancement of Learning, and the Wisdom of the Ancients. 
According to Benjamin Farrington, Bacon only published the latter two works in 
an effort to “prepare the public mind for the later full disclosure of his views.”2  
In the unpublished and incomplete Masculine Birth of Time, Bacon claims 
that he cannot “put the matter plainly before us,” but must employ “arts” and 
“subterfuges” in his writing. 3 The minds of men are not yet ready for the full 
disclosure of the project. Bacon generally speaks of his “method.” But his method 
and the method of its delivery are inherently connected. A method “must be 
found for quiet entry into minds”; it must be “mild and afford no occasion of error”; 
it must have in it “an inherent power of winning support and a vital principle which 
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will stand up against the ravages of time so that the tradition of science may 
mature and spread like some lively vigorous vine”; finally, the “science must be 
such as to select her followers, who must be worthy to be adopted into her 
family.”4 In other words, Bacon’s writing is and must be purposely enigmatical.  
 In the De Augmentis, Bacon tells us that there are occasions in which he 
has “determined to be silent, or to be very brief, which is the next thing to 
silence.”5 There is “a kind of eloquence in silence,” an “art of silence,” and Bacon 
plans to teach it by his own example in his discussion of his civil science.6 In 
addition to being silent, Bacon also informs us of the style of delivery that he 
intends to employ. He explicitly states that his “method of delivery” is 
“Acroamatic,” or esoteric (as opposed to the exoteric method), and it is the same 
method “used among the ancients.”7  As Lampert makes clear, the inherent 
obstacle of using a purposely obscure method of delivery is that Bacon “must 
leave obscure what kinds of obscurity might be employed, and what subject 
matters might be appropriate for its employment.”8 Likewise, Lampert observes 
that Bacon does tell us his intention for using this style. Bacon “describes only 
the intention fulfilled by obscurity: to keep out and to lure in.”9 Bacon chooses this 
style “both for the avoiding of abuse in the excluded and strengthening of 
affection in the admitted.”10 Lampert likens this explanation to what Plato says in 
the Republic: “to harm no one, and to do good to those who are good.”11 At the 
conclusion of the Valerius Terminus, Bacon imparts a sobering reason why he 
must employ the acroamatic style for the delivery of knowledge: “[t]hat there is no 
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composition of estate or society, nor order or quality of persons, which have not 
some point of contrariety towards true knowledge.”12 There is no doubt that there 
were very many who openly opposed “true knowledge” during Bacon’s time.13 
Lampert tells us that Nietzsche, after distancing himself from Kant’s faith 
in the Enlightenment, rediscovered the difference between the exoteric and the 
esoteric.14 For example, in “A Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” Kant 
tells us that to be “truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred 
command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any 
conveniences.”15 One might say that this dictum has had a prevailing effect on 
not only philosophy writings but also on the reading of philosophy. Apparently 
Nietzsche’s rediscovery of the esoteric and the exoteric was likewise lost. For, 
Alexandre Kojève reports that Leo Strauss “has reminded us of what has tended 
to be too easily forgotten since the nineteenth century,” namely, that one “ought 
not to take literally everything that the great authors of earlier times wrote, nor 
believe that they made explicit in their writings all that they wanted to say in 
them.”16 Strauss explains his rediscovery of the esoteric and exoteric in the 
following manner: 
In studying certain earlier thinkers, I became aware of this way of 
conceiving the relation between the quest for truth (philosophy or science) 
and society: Philosophy or science, the highest activity of man, is the 
attempt to replace opinion about ‘all things’ by knowledge of ‘all things’; 
but opinion is the element of society; philosophy or science is therefore 
the attempt to dissolve the element in which society breathes, and thus it 
endangers society. Hence philosophy or science must remain the 
preserve of a small minority, and philosophers or scientists must respect 
the opinions on which society rests. To respect opinions is something 
entirely different from accepting them as true. Philosophers or scientists 
who hold this view about the relation of philosophy or science and society 
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are driven to employ a peculiar manner of writing which would enable 
them to reveal what they regard as the truth to the few, without 
endangering the unqualified commitment of the many to the opinions on 
which society rests. They will distinguish between the true teaching as the 
esoteric teaching and the socially useful teaching as the exoteric 
teaching; whereas the exoteric teaching is meant to be easily accessible 
to every reader, the esoteric teaching discloses itself only to very careful 
and well-trained readers after long and concentrated study.17 
 
Also, if we compare the above summation of reasons for why philosophers have 
employed esoteric styles of writings with that of Bacon’s statement that “there is 
no composition of estate or society, nor order or quality of persons, which have 
not some point of contrariety towards true knowledge,” we come to understand 
why Bacon chooses the acroamatic, or esoteric, method for the delivery of 
knowledge. 
  
 
 
 
Avoiding and Interpreting Bacon 
 
We now consider some of Bacon’s detractors so that we can pass judgments on 
the merits or shortcomings of their criticisms. There are indeed some so bold as 
to claim that Bacon has had no influence on the history of science or philosophy. 
Furthermore, even if we could prove that Bacon’s influence was such that, in his 
absence, our world could be likened to George Orwell’s dismal depiction of the 
Middle Ages, Bacon’s writings would still be of no more use to practicing 
scientists today than if his impact were negligible. From the physicist’s point of 
view, modern physics “is just one link in a long chain of events that started from 
the work of Bacon, Galileo and Kepler.”18  
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However, we still have to take seriously the possibility that Bacon’s link on 
the chain is a crucially important one. In the remainder of this chapter, we look at 
three main groups of Baconian detractors. The first group avoids reading Bacon, 
the second reads and misinterprets Bacon, and the third reads and interprets 
Bacon but finds reasons why he is not of crucial importance to their histories of 
the scientific project.  Some scholars tend to twist words to fit their narratives; 
others completely misrepresent an author’s thoughts and intentions. This is why 
Dana Jalobeanu’s survey of the “idols of Baconian scholarship” is so novel. It is 
of no use writing off the most egregious corruptions of Bacon’s thought as the 
product of philosophical and scientific carelessness. This is why Jalobeanu’s 
study is instructive. However, because of her strict adherence to identifying the 
defects of scholarly works with Bacon’s idols, she is forced to track down some 
rather obscure and irrelevant interpretative works. Nevertheless, Jalobeanu’s 
survey helps to highlight two central and recurrent criticisms of Bacon. One is 
regarding the lack of mathematics in Bacon’s works; detractors grasp onto this 
deficiency as evidence of Bacon’s dislike or distrust of mathematics. The other 
centers on the idea that Bacon offers only vague promises and contributes 
nothing concrete to the modern project.  
 
 
Bacon and Mathematics 
 
There is a claim that Bacon disliked and distrusted mathematics as one of the 
“oldest and most entrenched idols of Baconian scholarship.”19 Faulkner also 
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points to the prevailing nature of this “profound misunderstanding,” and exposes 
those who promote such a misunderstanding by invoking Bacon’s own words in 
aphorism eight of Book Two of the New Organon: “the investigation of nature 
turns out best when physics is given definition by mathematics.”20 Jalobeanu 
cites Thomas Kuhn’s classification of sciences into the mathematical and 
Baconian as evidence of the “evaluative judgment” that Bacon “disliked and 
distrusted mathematics.”21 In this chapter, however, Kuhn is careful not to speak 
for Bacon when he speaks of “Baconians.” He differentiates between the 
classical and Baconian sciences—the latter being identified with a dislike and 
distrust in mathematics. Nevertheless, Kuhn does err when he conflates Bacon’s 
followers’ distrust of mathematics with Bacon’s being “distrustful…of 
mathematics.” In fairness to Kuhn, however, the passage in question regards 
Bacon’s distrust “not only of mathematics, but of the entire quasi-deductive 
structure of classical science.”22 Kuhn’s chapter as a whole does not indict Bacon 
for his supposed “distrust” of mathematics. Instead, it offers numerous defenses 
for the Baconian enterprise as a piece of the scientific project of the 17th and 
18th centuries.  
The seeming obsession with Bacon’s distrust, rejection, or indifference to 
mathematics makes up the majority of criticisms of Bacon because of the grip 
mathematics holds on modern physics today. This grip is not merely accidental; 
the language of physics is mathematics. Whether or not the universe was written 
in the language of mathematics or that mathematics offers up the best means to 
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understand the universe (because it is exact and precise) is another question 
altogether. Since Galileo, however, mathematics and the physical sciences have 
been inseparable: 
Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes—I 
mean the universe—but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn 
the language and grasp the symbols, in which it is written. This book is 
written in the mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, 
circles, and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible 
to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain 
through a dark labyrinth.23 
 
We need to understand that all practitioners and historians of modern science 
simply assume Galileo’s position. In Galileo’s Two New Sciences, for example, 
they see that it is not its dialectical form that makes it modern, but rather its use 
of mathematics to represent natural forces. This is why Galileo’s language seems 
especially prescient. Modern historians of science seem to take for granted the 
interpretation of Galileo’s quotation that takes it bearings from the contemporary 
use of mathematics in science: Galileo does not mean that the physical and the 
mathematical are synonymous; instead, Galileo states that the “language” of the 
universe is mathematical. One might say that this is a qualitative judgment, as 
well as a quantitative one. We describe the universe in a precise and exact way 
by mathematical figures and constructions. Bacon would certainly agree with 
Galileo that this use of mathematics (in physics) allows human beings to bypass 
many of the problems of spoken language that are the cause of the idols of the 
market.24 So once again, it does not seem that Bacon neither distrusts nor 
dislikes mathematics.  
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 Bacon also speaks of a labyrinthine universe, but the word “mathematics” 
is conspicuously absent. Bacon does, however, seem to aim for a guide to the 
universe in a similar way as to how Galileo describes the help of mathematics: 
Now to the human intellect reflecting on it, the fabric of the universe looks 
in its construction like a labyrinth, where we find everywhere so many 
blind alleys, such deceptions and misleading signs and such oblique and 
intricate convulsions and knots of nature…For these difficulties cannot be 
overcome by any amount of genius or repeated gambling on the results of 
experience. No, our tracks must be guided by a [thread], and a sound 
policy must secure every step of the way right from the very perceptions 
of the sense.25 
 
Even though Bacon does not specifically advocate the use of mathematics to aid 
in the uncovering of nature, it is consistent with Bacon’s contention that the 
“investigation of nature turns out best when physics is given definition by 
mathematics” to assume that the use mathematics figures largely in Bacon’s 
conception of the scientific enterprise. Bacon, like Galileo, looks at mathematics 
as a tool, an instrument that helps translate the particulars and generalities of the 
universe into an intelligible map. It seems compelling to agree with Faulkner that 
a “profound misunderstanding has prevailed” concerning the relation between 
Bacon and mathematics. Also, if one agrees with Jalobeanu that this relationship 
is responsible for the majority of errors of Baconian scholarship, then we have to 
consider seriously the possibility that our modern interpretations of Bacon are 
clouded by our understanding of the intricate relationship between science and 
mathematics, a relationship with which Bacon not only had no problem but in 
fact, advocated. 
! 22!
In the World of Mathematics, James Newman credits Bacon with 
epitomizing the procedure that Galileo Galilei followed: 
It was Galileo’s way to turn back and forth from hypothesis and deduction 
to experiment: no one before him attained a comparable skill in blending 
experiments with mathematical abstractions. In all his investigations he 
followed the procedure epitomized in a famous passage of Francis 
Bacon: ‘to educe and form axioms from experience….For our road does 
not lie on a level, but ascends and descends; first ascending to axioms, 
then descending to works.’26  
 
We see that in their respective commentaries on Galileo, Newman and Koyré 
come to seemingly incompatible judgments of Bacon’s influence on the history of 
science. Newman does not quantify the impact that Bacon’s “procedure” had on 
Galileo’s methods, but the parallel between Bacon’s prescription for a procedure 
and Galileo’s use of that procedure in “doing science” is manifest. This 
observation does not address whether, as Alexandre Koyré thinks, Bacon’s “role 
in the history of the scientific revolution was completely negligible.”27 It does, 
however, indicate that Bacon was not a fraud. Bacon did advocate a procedure 
that Galileo used and, at the least, Galileo’s methods look remarkably like those 
of Bacon.28 
Accordingly, Kuhn comes to Bacon’s defense against the “numerous 
historians, Koyré included, [who] have described the Baconian movement as a 
fraud, of no consequence of science.” Kuhn finds that such an incorrect 
evaluation is a “product of seeing the sciences as one.”29 One might say that 
those who think the Baconian movement a fraud are subject to their own 
historiographical tendencies in evaluating the history of science. It goes without 
saying that Kuhn is also subject to this same criticism, namely, the desire not to 
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view the sciences as one. In the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for example, 
the term “truth” occurs only in a quotation from Bacon. Kuhn found that Bacon’s 
methodological dictum, “truth comes more quickly from error than confusion,” 
correctly describes the “scientist’s conviction that incompatible rules for doing 
science cannot coexist except during revolutions when the profession’s main task 
is to eliminate all sets but one.”30 Kuhn thus found the perfect articulation of a 
fundamentally important aspect of his description of the developmental process 
of the sciences in Bacon’s own presentation of eliminative induction.  
It is difficult to pin down from where exactly these criticisms arose. Richard 
Kennington found that Immanuel Kant was probably the “last philosopher who 
took Francis Bacon seriously. Kant credits Bacon’s “ingenious proposals” with 
partly initiating the turn to natural philosophy and partly inspiring others to 
continue on the path.31  Continuing this track, Kennington contends that because 
Kant’s scientific and mathematical credentials are “more than adequate,” Kant’s 
“judgment of Bacon suggests that the meaning of the modern break with the 
tradition is independent of that turn to mathematics that we find in Descartes and 
his generation.”32  
 Laurence Berns takes the middle ground between those criticizing and 
those defending Bacon’s understanding of mathematics. Although Berns, like 
Faulkner, cites aphorism II.8 from the New Organon, he also thinks that Bacon 
did “not seem to appreciate what might be accomplished by framing one’s initial 
hypothesis in terms that are representable by mathematical symbols.”33 Berns 
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distills the gist of the mathematical criticism of Bacon: Bacon did not know the 
“technique of representing physical entities by mathematical symbols, so as to 
allow what one already knows from mathematics to suggest undiscovered 
relationships between the represented physical entities.”34 It is this process that 
has been so successful and has been central to the advancement of modern 
science (especially physics).  
 
 
Hypothetical Criticisms 
 
The other main criticism of Bacon’s philosophy regards the lack of attention he 
gives to hypothesis or speculative science. Faulkner surmises that this criticism 
(that Bacon “neglected the importance of the ‘ideal or speculative’ to even a 
useful science”) originally came from Hegel.35 Hegel’s critique could likewise be 
considered an idol of the cave. For Hegel, it is Bacon’s “empirical philosophy” 
that provides the grounds for an attack; empiricism takes “experience as the true 
and only source of knowledge” and then regulates the thought concerning it.36 
Faulkner, however, finds fault with Hegel’s classification of Bacon’s philosophy 
as merely empirical: “Bacon’s method is not empirical, but experimental.”37 It is 
doubtful whether Hegel, confronted with Faulkner’s rebuke, would change his 
characterization of Bacon’s philosophy. For Hegel, the flaws of Bacon’s 
philosophy lie not in the difference between empiricism and experimentalism, but 
in Bacon’s seeking knowledge from experience and by experiential (i.e. 
experimental) means. 
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 Hegel’s criticism stems from the fact that empiricism attains knowledge 
from experience rather than attaining knowledge from the “speculative Notion.” 
Hegel further asserts that knowledge that proceeds from the Notion is “ashamed” 
of knowledge from experience. Hegel’s criticism is a product of his very 
idiosyncratic philosophy. One sees throughout Hegel’s writings the importance of 
experience in the development, for example, of reason. His understanding of 
Bacon, then, rests on his particular philosophy of history—his historicism.38 The 
very idea of knowledge proceeding from experience disturbs Hegel. And he more 
or less blames Bacon for stopping the growth of philosophy in England. For the 
English are destined “to live always immersed in matter, and to have actuality but 
not reason as object.”39 Nevertheless, Hegel still considers Bacon to belong to 
the history of the sciences and philosophy because of Bacon’s introduction of a 
method of investigation.40 Hegel provides Bacon a place, an influential one at 
that, in the history of philosophy and science. Even so, the interpretation of 
Bacon’s philosophy as somehow exclusively empirical, and, therefore, anti-
theoretical, is widespread. The nineteenth-century chemist Justus Leibig 
launched an attack on Bacon for his preference of experimentation over that of 
theory. According to Alan J. Rocke, Leibig had been harmed by the negative 
reaction his book on plant nutrition had received in Britain, a reaction that was 
“clearly based on a Baconian preference for…practical experimentation.”41 The 
idea behind this criticism is that Bacon’s philosophy represented the paradigm of 
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practical experimentation; to discredit Bacon would discredit the idea of the 
superiority of practical as opposed to theoretical.  
 The New Organon supplies us with Bacon’s response to this criticism. 
Bacon tells us that there “are and can only be two ways of investigating and 
discovering truth.”42 It must be admitted that Bacon, here, depreciates the way 
that rushes up “from the sense and particulars to axioms of the highest 
generality,” and promotes the other way that draws “axioms from the sense and 
particulars by climbing steadily and by degrees so that it reaches the ones of 
highest generality last of all.”43 Bacon depreciates the first way because he 
assumes that argumentation is the means that seeks to establish axioms of the 
highest generality; he contends instead that the “subtlety of nature far surpasses 
the subtleties of argumentation.”44 The target of Bacon’s attack is not the validity 
of theory or hypothesis but the use of dialectic in searching for “basic principles 
or axioms.”45 He laments the fact that the axioms “now available are notional, 
abstract and without solidity” but also tells us that his “route and plan” is “to 
extract…from works and experiments causes and axioms, and in turn from 
causes and axioms new works and experiments.”46 In Bacon’s own words, we 
see some initial refutations of these two particular criticisms of his philosophy.  
 
 
Dreaming up a Flying Machine 
 
Kennington informs us that it is “often said, in depreciation of Bacon, that he 
supplied the rhetoric, or the prophetic vision, of the modern scientific 
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development or of the utopia to which it was to lead, but of that science itself he 
knew little or nothing.”47 This idea is deeply connected with the one that claims 
Bacon is an imprecise thinker, and according to Dennis Desroches, when 
twentieth-century thinkers such as Alfred North Whitehead and Karl Raimund 
Popper discuss Bacon, they “tend to avoid reading Bacon’s text even as they 
offer authoritative interpretations of it.” 48  Whitehead, for example, finds that 
Bacon was “one of the great builders who constructed the mind of the modern 
world,” while, at the same time, he thinks that he “completely missed the tonality 
which lay behind the success of seventeenth century science.”49 The reasons 
why some historians and scholars judge Bacon with blanket praise while others 
ridicule him seem to depend upon the aspects of Bacon’s work under 
consideration and the criteria used to form a judgment. Like Whitehead, C.S. 
Peirce takes a middle ground between admiration and criticism. Peirce finds 
Bacon’s conception of the procedure of modern science wholly inadequate. Even 
considering these reservations, Peirce does not find Bacon’s contributions to the 
project as a whole inadequate; in fact he praises Bacon’s “clear account of 
experience as something which must be open to verification and 
reexamination.”50 These analyses of Bacon all have in common their appreciation 
for his vision and depreciation of his works. We might call this the prophet 
argument. However, Paul Feyerabend credits Bacon with the realization that 
“scientific change involves a reformation not only of a few ideas, but of an entire 
world-view and, perhaps, of the very nature of humans.”51 In his assessment, the 
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vision is what led to the acceptance of a scientific world-view. In addition, if we 
think about Bacon’s necessary use of an esoteric style of writing in order to 
communicate his vision, we come to the conclusion that, without the proper 
spokesman, the entire reformation of the sciences may never have gotten off the 
ground.   
But there are others, however, who depreciate Bacon’s vision. As we saw 
above, Koyré thinks that Bacon’s role in the history of science was negligible. 
And Koyré’s depreciation of Bacon is different from Stove’s. The later finds that 
Bacon’s promise of enlightenment had influence, but was unfulfilled until recently. 
The former thinks Bacon to have had only trivial influence in the progression of 
science. Similarly, Imre Lakatos depreciates Bacon’s vision. Lakatos claims that 
Bacon is “a confused and inconsistent thinker, and a rationalist.”52 He labels 
Bacon one of the “first two modern élitists” (the other being Descartes), and he 
makes the claim that Bacon “thought that the scientific mind was one purged of 
‘prejudices’; such a mind became a tabula rasa on which Nature would imprint 
the truth about itself.”53 This is an odd assessment; we have seen above that 
Bacon specifically tells us the mind is not a “clean and flat slate” (that is, a tabula 
rasa). Lakotos, of course, is merely using Bacon as an example of a modern 
élitist.54 Nevertheless, Lakotos considers Bacon’s doctrine of the idols to be a 
form of psychologism; according to Lakotos, psychologism is one of the “four 
abhorrent philosophical doctrines” (see note below). What belies Lakatos’s 
criticism is not only the fact that he misconstrues Bacon’s understanding of the 
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mind but also the fact that he fails to show how Bacon is “a confused and 
inconsistent thinker.” The idea that Bacon was a rationalist contradicts the above 
criticisms that claimed he was an empiricist and anti-rationalist. Lakatos’s 
misrepresents Bacon so fully that his account is not merely flawed, but 
completely and utterly erroneous. We might call this the false prophet argument, 
for not only does it proclaim Bacon a false prophet, but also it is itself false.  
 Nevertheless, the idea that Bacon’s contributions to modern scientific 
development are merely of a rhetorical nature is widespread. Some of these 
accounts are worth investigating. In “A Promise Kept by Accident,” David Stove 
alters the prophet argument by suggesting that the recent success of science in 
increasing human happiness betrays any influence Bacon could have had in its 
fulfillment. Stove summaries Bacon’s promise as follows. Bacon believed in the 
association between new knowledge and useful applications: useful applications 
lead to new knowledge; and new knowledge guides the development of even 
newer applications. Science, then, improves human life by useful applications, 
and the improvement of life is to increases happiness by alleviating human ills 
and necessities. Bacon’s justification of Enlightenment was primarily of a 
utilitarian, and consequently, a philanthropic nature.  
However, this is where the association between the aims of Enlightenment 
and their fulfillment ends. According to Stove, the period from 1570 to 1770 
produced a greater amount of knowledge than at any other period of the same 
length, but “not a single important practical application.”55 If people had begun to 
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doubt that increased knowledge makes them better, they could have become 
convinced instead that increased knowledge makes them worse, and then the 
project might have been deserted.56 And there was no reason to think that 
knowledge and the discovery of new knowledge would bear fruits. In order to 
keep men from abandoning the project, Kant appealed “to dignity” as a new 
justification for enlightenment. 57  We see then that the utilitarian and ethical 
justifications both played their parts in allaying the fear that knowledge could 
make men worse: even if it did not lead to useful applications, the discovery and 
attainment of knowledge would be something dignified in itself, and the possibility 
that knowledge could lead to new applications that improve the condition of man, 
and thus, human happiness would remain the promise of enlightenment.  
But to interest the “mass of mankind” in the progress of knowledge, the 
Enlightenment once again became “identified with” the “promise that, by 
increasing knowledge, human happiness would be increased beyond all 
experience.”58  It was necessary to reassert the utilitarian justification of the 
progress of knowledge because the dignity of knowledge only mattered to a 
select few, but the promise of unimaginable happiness interests all mankind. 
Having been afforded the hindsight of history, Stove does not criticize the 
promise of Enlightenment. He does, however, make the following observations: 
Now, this promise which the Enlightenment held out has been kept in fact: 
modern science, as everyone knows, has enormously alleviated human 
misery. But there is an extraordinary fact about it, which is almost never 
noticed. This is that, when the promise was made first by Bacon, and for 
centuries afterwards during which the promise was constantly renewed, 
there was no evidence whatever that it could be kept.  
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The evident problem with Stove’s argument is that he admits, in his premise, the 
opposite conclusion that he wishes to imply. The implication is that the time 
between the utterance of the promise and its fulfillment determines the validity of 
the promise in the first place. In a similar manner, one could argue that, because 
the “promise was constantly renewed,” the timeframe between its utterance and 
its fulfillment is negligible. If there were no hope or evidence that it could be kept, 
then why would those after Bacon constantly renew something that seemed 
doomed?  
In Stove’s analysis, the very idea of the promise of humanitarianism, of 
Bacon’s promise, is to promote an egalitarian philosophy that can only end, 
logically and actually, in some form of communism. Stove draws attention to the 
food scarcities in the period from 1790 to 1890. More generally, he highlights the 
fact that even after the discoveries of Lavoisier, Newton, and Copernicus, “the 
most advanced country on earth was still basically a muscle economy.”59 He 
does not deny the existence of the industrial revolution; he does, however, deny 
that this “famous revolution constituted any sort of fulfillment of the 
Enlightenment’s promise.”60 The industrial revolution, thus, made people more 
miserable: 
[B]y making employment more unpredictable, work longer, harder, and 
unhealthier, and housing worse, it brought about an immense overall 
increase in misery. This increase has very often been exaggerated, of 
course, but it is scarcely possible to doubt its reality; otherwise, virtually 
everyone who wrote about urban Britain between 1790 and 1890 must 
have been hallucinated or telling lies.61 
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Stove contends that, were it not for the inventions of electricity and petroleum, the 
industrialized economies would have become socialist states. His criticism of the 
Enlightenment is of a primarily political nature: Enlightenment ethics brought 
about the welfare state and trade unions. The welfare state and trade unions are 
“only very incomplete realizations of Enlightenment ethics.” According to Stove, 
“[e]galitarian benevolence cannot be fully satisfied by anything short of 
communism.” 62  Communism is the logical consequence of the idea of 
egalitarianism.63 We now have a clearer picture of Stove’s cutting critique of the 
promise of the Enlightenment. Bacon’s initial unification of scientific advancement 
with humanitarian ethics, which was proposed in order to arouse popular support 
for the project, has, because of science’s success in alleviating human misery, 
become the essence of the modern age.  
 Stove’s only tenable argument against Bacon’s role in its fulfillment rests 
on a temporal argument; it took a lot of time for the promise to be fulfilled. 
However, Stove cannot deny the truth of its fulfillment. Some Christians, for 
example, think that Jesus’s promise that the kingdom of heaven will come to 
earth was fulfilled as Christianity spread and became the dominant religion of the 
world.64 We can disagree with them as to the truth of their premise—that is, what 
the kingdom of heaven on earth means; however, if we accept their premise, we 
cannot disagree with their conclusion. Stove does not even dispute the meaning 
of Bacon’s promise. That Bacon’s promise took time to fulfill is not a valid reason 
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to doubt its truth. Even Orwell thinks that the living conditions among the working 
class of industrial England are favorable to their alternative: 
A windowless hut, a wood fire which smokes in your face because there 
is no chimney, mouldy bread, “Poor John,” lice, scurvy, a yearly childbirth 
and a yearly child-death, and the priest terrifying you with tales of Hell.65 
 
The idea that the majority of the alleviations of human miseries are mainly due to 
the accidental discoveries of electricity and petroleum may, in fact, be true. But 
the fact that these discoveries are not the products of philosophical speculation 
or divine intervention speaks to the very truth of Bacon’s promise. Furthermore, 
as referenced above, Kuhn’s inclusion of the term “truth” in the Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions is his citation of Francis Bacon’s dictum that truth emerges 
more readily from error than from confusion. What we failed to mention, however, 
is that the context in which Kuhn cites the dictum is one regarding electrical 
research: the “effectiveness and efficiency of electrical research increased 
accordingly, providing evidence for a societal version of Francis Bacon’s acute 
methodological dictum.”66  
 However, as compelling it might seem, the gist of Stove’s critique of 
Bacon’s promise is that Bacon sought practical results of his instauration of the 
arts and sciences immediately. In fact, Bacon explicitly says that he seeks “at the 
start and for some time after…experiments of light not fruit.”67 Bacon explains 
why he first seeks knowledge in the following passage: 
Thus if anyone thinks that things of this kind are useless, he is doing the 
same as supposing that light is useless just because it is not a solid or 
materiate. But in reality it should be said that well examined and defined 
knowledge of simple natures is like light which gives access to all the 
innards of operation, and with its particular power pulls together and 
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draws down floods of works and of most noble axioms in its wake, but is 
still of no great use taken by itself. So also the elements that are letters of 
the alphabet, taken by themselves and in isolation, signify nothing and are 
of no use; but to the structure and organization of all discourses they are 
like material prima. So again the seeds of things strong in their potentiality 
(unless they be at work) are of no use. And dispersed rays of light (unless 
they come together) fail to give us their benefit.68 
 
It is perhaps a remarkable irony that Bacon uses the example of light here. 
Bacon tells us that this is how the sciences will progress for some time. We see, 
for example, that Michael Faraday’s experimental research in electricity led to his 
discovery of electromagnetic induction; this, in turn, led to Maxwell’s 
mathematization of electromagnetic induction and fundamentally changed 
modern scientific knowledge and its applications forever; these applications 
include electrical power.69 The very idea that the human race could have sped up 
its scientific discoveries is fantastical. Furthermore, Bacon’s appeal to the varied 
uses of the printing press, the compass, and gunpowder provides evidence for 
his promise.  
 We may, however, rightfully be able to criticize Bacon for not being as 
precise as we want Bacon to be. Since the modern age is one characterized by 
exactness and precision, then Bacon’s failure to produce some concrete work or 
offer some definite and useable scientific theories would disqualify him from the 
pantheon of scientific geniuses. This is a form of the prophet argument, and 
Wittgenstein criticizes Bacon for exactly his imprecision as a thinker: 
Bacon, in my view, was not a precise thinker. He had large-scale and, as 
it were, wide-ranging visions. But if this is all someone has, he is bound to 
be generous with his promises and inadequate when it comes to keeping 
them. 
     Someone might dream up a flying machine without being precise 
about its details. He might imagine its looking externally very much like a 
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real aeroplane and describe its functioning graphically. Neither it is 
obvious that a phantasy like this must be worthless. Perhaps it will 
stimulate work of a different sort in others. —So while these others make 
preparations, a long time in advance as it were to build an aeroplane that 
will really fly, he occupies himself with dreaming about what such an 
aeroplane will have to look like and what it was be capable of doing. This 
says nothing about the value of these activities. The dreamer’s may be 
worthless—and so may the others’.70 
 
This might seem like the more general form of Stove’s criticism. However, it is, in 
fact, not a criticism at all. To understand what Wittgenstein is thinking here, it is 
instructive to look at the only other instances in Wittgenstein’s works that mention 
Bacon:  
A philosopher says “Look at things like this!” —but in the first place that 
doesn’t ensure that people will look at things like that, and in the second 
place his admonition may come altogether too late; it’s possible, 
moreover, that such an admonition can achieve nothing in any case and 
that the impetus for such a change in the way things are perceived has to 
originate somewhere else entirely. For instance it is by no means clear 
whether Bacon started anything moving, other than the surface of his 
readers’ minds.71 
 
It is now even more tempting to think of these criticisms as especially harsh, but 
these assessments of Bacon are also self-comparisons. For example, while 
studying mechanical engineering, Wittgenstein did design plans for an aircraft 
engine that proposed rotating the “propeller by means of high-speed gases 
rushing from a combustion chamber,” but the “idea was fundamentally flawed, 
and quite impractical for propelling an aeroplane.”72  
The second quotation is situated between Wittgenstein’s thoughts on how 
his own works will be considered by posterity. Wittgenstein thinks that Bacon “got 
bogged down in his philosophical works, and this is a danger that threatens me 
too.”73 Wittgenstein says of himself that the most he “might expect to achieve by 
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way of effect is that [he] should first stimulate the writing of a whole lot of garbage 
and that then this perhaps might provoke somebody to write something good,” 
and that he “ought never to hope for more than the most indirect influence.”74 
Even if we were to accept unequivocally the idea that Bacon only contributed to 
moving “the surface of his readers’ minds,” this moving may be the 
“reformation…of an entire world-view and, perhaps, of the very nature of 
humans” of which Feyerabend credits to Bacon.  
 Bacon is “no founder of sects.” He does “not chase like a child after golden 
apples, but stake[s] everything on a victory for art in its race against nature.”75 To 
accomplish such a monumental task, Bacon has to free the mind from its fetters. 
In Kant’s very demand that we be “truthful (honest) in all declarations,” we see 
that the minds of men have indeed become free; the fact that philosophy and 
science no longer require esoteric methods of conveying knowledge reveals that 
Bacon’s project has conquered the mind of society. In the following chapter, we 
see how Bacon’s system of skepticism was monumental in removing the 
obstacles to science.   !!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter Three 
Reasons for Skepticism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning the condition of the sciences: that it is unprosperous, nor 
much improved; and that a way completely different from the one known 
before should be opened for the human intellect, and other helps devised 
to let the mind exert its proper authority over the nature of things.1 
 
 
These are the first words of the Great Instauration. What Bacon sees is not just 
an intellectual and epistemological stagnation but also an inadequate authority 
over the nature of things. In others words, man is dumb and weak. He transforms 
this dissatisfaction into an attack on the current stagnation of the sciences and on 
what he perceives to be its foundations. Men overrate their strength and 
underrate their store, and they spend their overrated strength on trivial matters. If 
a person were to look carefully at all the books of the arts and sciences, he “will 
find everywhere endless repetition of the same old stuff…so that the whole lot, at 
first glance impressive, turns out on closer inspection to be paltry.” The “wisdom” 
that we derive from the Greeks is “the boyhood of science and, as with boys: it is 
all prattle and no procreation.” They were unproductive and barren: they never 
penetrated the inner chambers of nature. That is not to say, however, that there 
is nothing in what the Greeks left to posterity; rather, posterity can reap no fruit 
from a barren tree. 
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 The unprosperous situation, however, is not simply from the fault of the 
Greeks. Their influence is certainly part of the problem, but we must also 
overcome the obstacles that the senses and intellect present us: “[t]he result is 
that, taken as a whole, human reasoning as applied to the investigation of nature 
is not at all well sorted and set up, but like some stately pile with no 
foundations.”2 Bacon tells King James that he aims to kindle a new light in the 
“dark recess of philosophy” and science by resting them on “the firm foundation 
of well weighed experience of every kind.”3 The uncertain and irregular light of 
the senses constantly fails to illuminate the way through experiences and 
particulars—sometimes failing, sometimes yielding no new information. The 
notions of things, which the mind readily and passively imbibes, stores up, and 
accumulates, are false, confused, or overhastily abstracted from the facts; and, 
those children of knowledge, the ancient Greeks, confound the problems of 
sense and intellect by relying on the latter to raise up the objects of the senses 
(the particulars) to the most general propositions.4  
 The solution to the problems that plague the sciences is to restructure and 
reorient them, and Bacon seeks to use the two great obstacles to science, sense 
and the intellect, to acquire knowledge. However, this combination of sense and 
intellect to acquire knowledge seems to have been exactly what the Greeks 
used. The Greeks trusted the senses insofar as what they sensed allowed the 
intellect to run wild. Bacon, however, trusts in the obscurity of nature, the fallibility 
of the senses, and the overzealousness of the intellect. Because of his mistrust 
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of those two faculties and the object of inquiry, nature, Bacon amends these 
deficiencies in his presentation of his induction: 
But I hold that true logic ought to enter the particular provinces of the 
sciences with greater authority than that conferred by their own principles, 
and that the supposed principles should themselves be made to tell us 
how far they are properly established. As for the first notions of the 
intellect, none that the intellect left to itself has amassed is above 
suspicion, and I acquit none unless it has been put on trial anew and 
judged according to it. And yes, I have many means of testing the 
informations of the sense itself. For the senses often deceive but they 
also testify to their own errors. Now the errors are right here, but what 
testifies to them has to be sought further afield.5 
 
The remedy for the inadequacies of the senses is to use experiments in which 
the sense has the authority to judge the experiments, rather than judging the 
phenomena themselves. The senses, thus, judge the results, not the thing itself, 
and Bacon offers the sciences a sort of filter for the opacity of the sense, and a 
tool to uncover facts from the things of nature. Because the deficiencies of the 
intellect tend to be more troublesome than those of the senses, Bacon needs to 
provide us with another kind of help if these are to produce any fruit. Unlike those 
who maintain acatalepsy, who insist nothing can be known, Bacon finds that “not 
much in nature can be known by the way now in use.”6  
And it is for this reason that Bacon is the first of the moderns to offer a 
refutation of the natural human mind, his doctrine of idols. This kind of critique or 
refutation is one of the defining characteristics of enlightenment philosophy. What 
is distinctively modern about Bacon may indeed be found in his critique of the 
human mind. Both Laurence Berns and Carl Page found that this “critique,” or the 
“modern tradition of reason’s total and systematic self-criticism” began with 
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Bacon and culminated in reaching “a pristine focus in Kant.”7 Reinhard Brandt, 
however, finds that Bacon’s doctrine of idols generally belongs to the classical 
tradition of theories of error: he includes Plato’s allegory of the cave, Locke’s 
analysis of innate ideas, Kant’s theory of the dialectic of pure reason, and Marx’s 
idea of the economic and political perversion of consciousness as other such 
theories of error.8   
Regardless of whether or not Bacon established a new, non-classical kind 
of theory of error, he indisputably initiated the modern tradition. This tradition 
found an immediate successor in Descartes’ skepticism, a system famous for its 
radical doubt. Both thinkers advanced systems of skepticism to cleanse the 
intellect of its prejudices and draw attention to its errors. Although Descartes’s 
arguments for doubting might seem to lead to a form of methodological solipsism, 
the intent of the thought experiment is to “prepare [his] readers’ minds for the 
study of things which are related to the intellect,” and in a reply to one of Hobbes’ 
objections, Descartes said that his arguments for doubting were “merely 
plausible,” which implies that he did not really accept the thought experiment as 
valid.9  
According to Paul Feyerabend, Bacon and Descartes’s interests in the 
“psychology of belief” was what led them to develop theories of idols. These 
theories have three principal functions: to explain why man is deceived, to devise 
a method to undeceive man, and to condition man’s mind to be able to 
understand the arguments of the new philosophy, and “cling unwaveringly to their 
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results.”10  Furthermore, if we follow Carl Page’s suggestion that Descartes’s 
skepticism, the metaphysics of the Meditations, is a “subversion on behalf of his 
physics,” then this subversion is only possible once the new has been written on 
the uneven slate of the mind.  
Bacon was indeed a skeptic, but Feyerabend’s contention that the doctrine 
of the idols originated in an interest in the psychology of belief is misleadingly 
narrow. Bacon’s doctrine of the idols was, perhaps, the first modern attempt at 
creating an epistemology, but it is not merely a theory of errors, a notice of 
warning, or an acknowledgement of the fallibility of the senses and intellect. 
Bacon’s doctrine serves to free the mind from its idols by drawing attention to 
them.  It both illuminates the problems and shows the way out. In the first place, 
Bacon acknowledged the need to help the deficiencies of the senses and intellect 
through instruments and skillfully and artfully devised experiments. Because the 
“immediate and peculiar perception of the sense” is often obscured or illusory, 
Bacon needed to provide us with help: he contrived that the “sense judges only 
the experiments, whereas the experiment judges the thing.”11  
However, the provisions of sense judging experiment and experiment 
judging the thing would only be sufficient for finding the light of nature if “the 
human intellect were flat and like a clean slate.”12  As we indicated in our 
introduction, Bacon finds that “men’s minds are so marvelously beset that they 
altogether lack a clear and polished surface to focus the true rays of things,” and 
he thinks himself obliged to find a remedy for this too.13 In other words, the 
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project itself cannot begin to take flight until he finds a way to deal with the idols. 
However, Bacon’s descriptions of his doctrine of the idols change throughout his 
writings. We follow Brandt’s suggestion that the doctrine of idols is itself a 
“protean construction” (proteisches Gebilde).14 In this chapter, we follow the idols 
as they morph from their first iteration into their final shape in the New Organon.  
 
 
A Fragment of Idols 
 
The first work in which Bacon mentions the idols is the Masculine Birth of Time 
(1602). As Bacon tended to do, the Masculine Birth of Time was only the primary 
title of the work. In the place of a preface, Bacon offers a prayer. Here, the title of 
the work is The Masculine Birth Of Time Or The Great Instauration Of The 
Dominion Of Man Over The Universe. The title then morphs into The Masculine 
Birth of Time Or Three Books On The Interpretation Of Nature.15 Benjamin 
Farrington notes that the “promise” of three books makes clear that this work is 
only a fragment.16 Farrington suggests that the “style of abuse” employed in the 
Masculine Birth of Time began to give Bacon pause and could explain why 
Bacon ultimately decided not to finish the work but instead chose to disclose his 
project in other works that were less polemical and liable to give offense.17 
However, the Masculine Birth of Time is, then, the right place to begin to look at 
the idols. Bacon only mentions three idols in this work, and although Graham 
Rees claims that Bacon “says nothing further about them” besides mentioning 
the idols, we follow Brandt in analyzing some of the arguments from the 
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Masculine Birth of Time so that we can better grasp the Bacon’s final 
presentation of his doctrine. Bacon first alludes to the idols in the prayer that 
prefaces the text, and the prayer is very similar to the one Bacon offers in the 
“Preface” to the Great Instauration. Therefore, we have two compelling reasons 
to reproduce it here in full: 
 TO GOD THE FATHER 
God the Word, God the Spirit, we pour out our humble and burning 
prayers, that mindful of the miseries of the human race and this our mortal 
pilgrimage in which we wear out evil days and few, they would send down 
upon us new streams from the fountains of their mercy for the relief of our 
distress; and this too we would ask, that our human interests may not 
stand in the way of the divine, nor from the unlocking of the paths of 
sense and the enkindling of a greater light in nature may any unbelief or 
darkness arise in our minds to shut out the knowledge of the divine 
mysteries; but rather that the intellect made clean and pure from all vain 
fancies, and subjecting itself in voluntary submission to the divine oracles, 
may render to faith the things that belong to faith.18 
 
However, after giving to “faith that which is faith’s” in the prayer from the Great 
Instauration, Bacon lastly prays that with “the sciences discharged of the 
serpents poison which swells and puffs up the human soul; we do not aspire to 
know what is too exalted or beyond the bounds of discretion, but cultivate the 
truth in charity.”19  
We agree with Desroches’ finding that the “prayer, despite its pretension 
to humility, exhibits, precisely, a pretension to humility,” and the lack of any limit 
to knowledge in the first prayer makes this pretension even more glaring.20 
Desroches points out that this is clearly Bacon’s reconfiguration of the words of 
Jesus: Jesus tells us to “give the things of Caesar to Caesar / And the things of 
God to God.”21 As Desroches sees it, “if one gives to Caesar in order that one 
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may clear space to attend to God, Bacon inverts the movement of priority, such 
that one gives to faith in order to clear space for science.”22 Another possibility is 
that the cleaning and purifying the intellect of “all vain fancies” is what gives faith 
that which is faith’s. In other words, the things of faith are vain fancies, and are 
unfit for the intellect—or, at the very least, unfit for science.  
 Bacon tells his readers that his intention is not to impart to us “a mixture of 
religion and science”; instead, he means to lead us to nature, to “bind her” to our 
service and make her our slave.23 It is with “the most loyal faith,” and “out of the 
profoundest care for the future,” that Bacon conveys to us the instruction for his 
most legitimate method.24 It is not a coincidence that Bacon reintroduces “faith”; 
but free from its heavenly dependence, Bacon places his faith in those who take 
up his project. He places his faith in human beings to fulfill his “earthly wish.” As 
we saw in Chapter Two, the reason that Bacon must use deliberately esoteric 
language (the “arts and subterfuges”) is that the minds of men are not yet ready 
to have “the matter plainly before” them. For, Bacon explains to us, all the 
“approaches and entrances to men’s minds are beset and blocked by the most 
obscure idols—idols deeply implanted and, as it were, burned in” so that there 
remains no “clean and polished surface…in the mirror of the mind on which the 
genuine natural light of things can fall.”25 Bacon tells us once again that the mind 
is not a blank slate, but we also see that the “legitimate method” that Bacon has 
prepared for the men’s minds when they are ready to receive it is intricately 
connected with the elimination of the idols that block its access.  
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 Bacon commences his attack on the “philosophers”: they “debauch our 
minds”; they deceive us; and worse still, their follows are parasitic.26 Bacon first 
summons “that worst of sophists”, Aristotle, to the bar to stand trial: he was 
“stupefied by his own unprofitable subtlety”; “he composed an art or manual of 
madness and made us slaves to words”; and worse still, Aristotle supplied the 
“precepts and propositions” from which the quibblers of the schools found their 
nourishment.27 For those who claimed that Aristotle conducted experiments of 
the kind that Bacon advocated, Bacon denounced any such contention: 
[Aristotle] still moved in the daylight of honest research when he fetched 
up his darksome idols from some subterranean cave, and over such 
observation of particulars as had been made spun as it were spiders’ 
webs which he would have us accept as causal bonds, though they have 
no strength nor worth.28 
  
Aristotle, then, is the philosophical manifestation of subterranean man. Brandt 
thinks that Bacon could be thinking of Plato’s allegory of the cave from the 
Republic, he could be thinking of Cicero’s variant in De Natura Deorum, or he 
could even be thinking of Aristotle’s now lost version of the cave that Cicero 
discusses. However, according to Brandt it is Arnobius of Sicca’s cave that 
makes the most sense for Bacon’s purposes.29  
 In Arnobius’s Case Against the Pagans, he proposes a “controlled 
experiment”: isolate a baby from birth so completely that there is no discernable 
difference in anything (in sound, in temperature, in daylight, in season, and so on 
and so forth); and give the infant only what is necessary to survive, letting him 
grow up without having any interaction with anything or anyone. When he is forty 
years old, bring him to an assembly and interrogate him. Arnobius then asks, 
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“[w]ill he not stand there more stupid and duller than any cattle, log, stone?”30 
The thought experiment leads into an attack on Plato’s doctrine of recollection in 
the Meno. The idea, however, behind Brandt’s finding is clear. The mind of 
Arnobius’s caveman would properly be called a blank slate, and his mind would 
neither have nor be connected to any ideas. Bacon’s use of the cave then has 
two purposes. First, it implies that no one is free from the ideas that have been 
passed down from philosophies and theologies. And second, those—like 
Aristotle—who think that they use their reason within the confines of mind and 
find truth there are deluding themselves.31  
 Bacon goes on to criticize Plato, and one might say that Plato dwells 
deeper in Arnobius’s cave than Aristotle. Accordingly, Plato “dealt us a mortal 
blow” when he “gave out the falsehood that truth is, as it were, the native 
inhabitant of the human mind and need not come in from outside to take up its 
abode there” and “when [he] turned our minds away from observation, away from 
things.”32 The fundamental difference between Aristotle’s folly and Plato’s is that 
Aristotle “still moved in the daylight of honest research,” while Plato “taught us to 
turn our mind’s eye inward and grovel before our own blind and confused idols 
under the name of contemplative philosophy.”33  
We might suppose that Plato is a far worse offender of truth than Aristotle 
because he taught us to turn inward—away from things—and Aristotle merely 
followed his lead. Although this is true, they are also both guilty of different kinds 
of error.34 Plato props us his philosophy with religion.35 Aristotle corrupts natural 
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philosophy with his logic.36 And by Plato’s theology and Aristotle’s logic, they 
both “corrupted man’s view of nature.”37 In other words, Plato put philosophy on 
the path to theology, or at least opened the door to theology, and Aristotle 
created a system of disputation that is unrelated to natural things—a system that 
is disinterested in truth. Bacon also admonishes the schools of the scholastics, 
not only in following Aristotle’s system of disputations (which would be following 
an idol of the theater), but also of bringing in their own idols, “particularly of those 
of the market-place and the cave.” 38  In their interpretations of nature, the 
scholastics snatch up any facts that fit in with their “preconceptions” and force 
“everything else into harmony with them.”39 The different schools have their own 
“vernaculars” by which they interpret nature, and these vernaculars are sourced 
from the very style of argumentation that Aristotle helped to grow.  
To make matters worse—or perhaps the reason matters are worse—
“theologians…have borrowed freely from [Aristotle’s] philosophy and have thus 
established a system of speculation in which the doctrines are combined.”40 
Farrington believes that the “attack” on Plato is “to be explained in terms of 
[Bacon’s] contemporary situation.” 41  However, we do not find Farrington’s 
explanation that the “political hostility” of Bacon’s day arose from the “aristocratic 
culture” attributable to Plato to be very compelling.42 We instead contend that 
Bacon wants to free the sciences from faith—that is, from religion—and that 
Bacon’s denunciations of their philosophies have a double purpose. He does 
indeed wish to separate natural philosophy from philosophy, but he also wants to 
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loosen religion’s grasp on both. He cannot attack religion outright: he can only 
leave to religion that which is religion’s. 43 Bacon mostly abstains from 
commentating on the much “admired” ethics of Plato and Aristotle; he mentions 
only that the “pages of Tacitus breathe a livelier and truer observation of morals 
and institutions.”44 Tacitus tells us of a Rome that is “a scene of ceaseless 
bloodshed” in which the “force of terror had utterly extinguished the sense of 
human fellowship, and, with the growth of cruelty, pity was thrust aside.”45 In 
Bacon’s turning to Tacitus for a “livelier and truer observation of morals,” we see 
why Howard White, Richard Kennington, and Robert Faulkner have all 
understood the moral implications of Bacon’s writings to be of a Machiavellian 
variant.46 In looking to Tacitus, Bacon followed Machiavelli’s teaching that it is 
“more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination 
of it,” “for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go 
of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his 
preservation.”47 We are again reminded that the Bacon’s new method is not to be 
followed exclusively in the natural sciences but also in “logic, ethics, and politics.”  
At the conclusion of the Masculine Birth of Time, Bacon reiterates that we 
cannot begin to grapple with the “bewildering complexities of experimental 
science” before our minds have been purged of their idols.48 Bacon once again 
tells us that the mind is not like a waxen tablet where we must rub out the old to 
write the new; with the mind, we cannot rub out the old until we have written in 
the new.49 Bacon warns us that if we were to divest ourselves of “the idols of the 
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inn, there would be every fear of…falling victim to the idols of the road.”50 He 
does not exactly clarify what these two new idols are or with what other iterations 
they might be identified, but as we shall see in the next part, Bacon reduces—for 
good—the number of idols to four. Bacon tells us that we have become “too 
accustomed to following a guide,” and this is likely the sentiment expressed by 
the idols of the inn and idols of the road. They would be idols of how we normally 
do things or think about things. In other words, we normally follow this or that line 
of thinking down the road until we stop at a resting place, an inn.  
Bacon finishes the fragment with two striking allusions. He first compares 
our situation to that of a Roman “when tyranny was once in the saddle,” and “the 
oath of allegiance to the Senate and the People became a vain thing.”51 He is 
likely thinking of the situations recounted by Tacitus when the sense of human 
fellowship had been utterly extinguished (see citation above). But Bacon then 
tells his reader to take heart: “and give yourself to me so that I may restore you to 
yourself.”52  Once again, Bacon inverts the words of Jesus. The Gospels of 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke each contain some iteration of Jesus’s following 
instruction, “[i]f anyone wishes to be my follower, / Deny yourself and take up the 
cross / And follow me.”53 Bacon’s second inversion of the words of Jesus is even 
more striking than the first; Jesus instructs his followers as to how they can be 
saved, not in this world, but in the next world. The implication of Bacon’s 
instruction is that he will save us from being deluded into thinking there is a next 
world. Even with its pretensions not to put the matter plainly before us, the 
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Masculine Birth of Time openly discloses the irreligious aspect of Bacon’s plan. If 
we now think again about the difference between the prayer from the Great 
Instauration and the one presented here, the restriction on the ambition of 
knowledge and the cultivation of truth in charity are glaringly absent. In sum, 
Bacon has added a Christian cover to his project.  
 
 
Four Idols: Three Innate, One Extrinsic 
 
Between Bacon’s brief mention of the idols in the Masculine Birth of Time to their 
final product in the New Organon, the idols crop up in the Valerius Terminus, the 
Advancement of Learning, and the Partis instaurationis secundae delineatio. It is 
in their final form that Bacon carefully stages their “public exposure and 
humiliation.”54 Bacon adds a fourth category idol, the idol of the tribe, in the 
Valerius Terminus. In the Advancement, like the Masculine Birth of Time, there 
are only three “false appearances” mentioned.55 Although Bacon does not name 
them specifically, he briefly discusses the characteristics of the idols of the tribe, 
the idols of the cave, and the idols of the market-place. The idols of the theater 
are absent from this presentation. Bacon does mention the idols of the theater in 
the De Augmentis.56 Rees claims that in a marginalium of the Advancement, 
Bacon distinguishes between innate and extrinsic idols.57 Furthermore, in the De 
Augmentis, Bacon outright distinguishes between innate and extrinsic idols; 
however, only the idols of the theater are extrinsic and “may be rejected and got 
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rid of.”58 Therefore, it is not clear to what the marginalium refers: it cannot refer to 
any of the idols mentioned in the Advancement as they are all innate.  
The distinction between innate and extrinsic idols is further muddled by the 
introduction of three classes of idols in the delineatio, “those associated with the 
dogmas of the philosophers, with perverse laws of demonstration, and with the 
very nature of the mind.” 59 The first two classes are extrinsic; the third is innate. 
Bacon’s three refutations correspond to the three classes of idols, and since we 
are presented with four idols in the New Organon, the idols of the theater 
correspond to the refutations of the philosophers and to the perverse laws of 
demonstration; the other three idols, then, correspond to the refutation of the very 
nature of the mind.60  
The mind, as has been said, is not a “clear and polished surface,” but 
even if the mind could be “clear and polished” (that is, free of its idols), it would 
still be like an “uneven mirror” that “bends the rays of things according to its own 
shape and section.”61 Peter Urbach draws to our attention the fact that Popper 
and Mary Hesse fell victim to the misconception that the idols can be purged from 
the mind.62 Hesse claims that the “intellect is to be purged by the practice of true 
induction” so that the “mind is to be made into, what Locke was later to say it is 
naturally, a ‘tabula abrasa.’”63 Similarly Popper tells us that Bacon “held that to 
prepare the mind for the intuition of the true essence of nature of a thing, it has to 
be meticulously cleansed of all anticipations, prejudices, and idols.”64 Locke’s 
contention is that there are no innate ideas; therefore, the mind is “as we say, 
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white paper, void of all Characters.”65 Popper and Hesse, thus, conflate Locke’s 
contention that the mind begins as a tabula abrasa with Bacon’s conception that 
the mind altogether lacks a “clear and polished surface to focus the true rays of 
things.” Urbach does, however, admit that a few of Bacon’s “glosses on the idols 
do encourage this standard view.”66 What they fail to understand is that Bacon’s 
“remedy” is not to eliminate the idols from the mind, but to restrain and drive them 
off; and bringing about this remedy is primarily accomplished by “just drawing 
attention to them.”67 According to Bacon, the central problem is that when the 
mind is “affected by things by way of the sense,” it “faithlessly implants and 
intermixes its own nature with the nature of things when sorting out and devising 
its notions.”68  In other words, the three idols that deal specifically with the 
constitution of the mind are ineradicable. Bacon provides the following simile: 
“[f]or the doctrine of idols stands in a similar relationship to the Interpretation of 
Nature,69 as the doctrine of Sophistical Refutations does to ordinary dialectic.”70 It 
is now clear why Bacon differentiates between the innate and extrinsic idols. Only 
the latter kind, the idols of the theater, can be purged from the intellect by means 
of refutations; whereas, the only remedy for the idols of the tribe, the cave, and 
the market is the drawing of attention to them.  
 
 
Idols of the Tribe 
 
The idols of the tribe are “rooted in human nature itself and in the very tribe or 
race of men, and “all perceptions of sense and mind are built to the scale of man 
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and not the universe.”71These idols are products of the human intellect; the 
intellect is the filter through which all perceptions must pass: it “mingles its own 
nature with the nature of things, and distorts and stains” the nature of things like 
an “uneven mirror” does to the “rays of things.”72 And this distortion is made 
worse by the very constitution of the intellect. It is like a self-supporting edifice: 
for it is “constitutionally prone to supposing that there is more order and equality 
in things than it actually finds.”73 By nature, it is not only prone to suppose more 
order and uniformity in things than there actually is but also pulls everything else 
into an agreement with the conceptions that have already won its approval.74 
The intellect “despises,” “dismisses,” and “rejects” any contrary 
instances.75 This is the human propensity for superstition and results from the 
intellect’s “peculiar and permanent error of being moved and excited more by 
affirmatives than negatives.”76 By highlighting this “permanent error,” we are once 
again reminded that the idols of the tribe are innate and, thus, cannot be purged 
from the mind. One might think that its propensity for affirmatives, which is the 
basis of superstition, is relatively harmless, but this error pushes the intellect 
forward into rather absurd attempts to find uniformity in the world. For example, it 
is, by reductio ad absurdum, impossible to square the circle in Euclidian space. 
This impossibility can be demonstrated, but for as long as geometry has been 
taught, countless attempts at the positive proof have been made. The intellect is 
uncomfortable with negative instances. According to Bacon, however, negative 
instances have greater weight than positive ones, and this point is made clear by 
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any proof by reductio ad absurdum. The intellect is fond of the easily graspable 
and the homogeneous and unsuited for remote and heterogeneous instances.77 
Furthermore, it is restless and aspires to go further: “[i]t cannot therefore 
conceive of any end or limit to the world, but always compulsively hankers after 
something beyond.”78 The insinuation is that the source of the idea of an afterlife, 
or by consequence a Supreme Being, is our “peculiar and permanent error of 
being moved and excited more by affirmatives than negatives.” Bacon also 
attacks the Aristotelian idea of causes, which flows from the same source of 
error. In the Physics, Aristotle defends causes in the following manner: 
It is absurd to think that a thing does not happen for the sake of 
something if we do not see what sets it in motion deliberating. Surely 
even art does not deliberate. If shipbuilding were present in wood, it 
would act in the same way as nature does, so if being for the sake of 
something is present in art, it is also present in nature. This is most clear 
when someone practices medicine himself on himself; for nature is like 
that. That, then, nature is a cause, and in this way, for the sake of 
something, is clear.79 
 
Bacon finds the above defense of final causes preposterous. It is indicative of the 
intellect’s failure to stop when it does not find causes for the “highest universals 
in nature,” so that it falls back on “final causes which obviously come from the 
nature of man rather than of the universe.”80 This is the source from which 
philosophers have corrupted philosophy.  
 That the senses are dull, inadequate, and unreliable and the will and 
affections contaminate the intellect are great hindrances that distort the human 
intellect.81The intellect desires too much; the senses provide too little. As Bacon 
tells us, the remedy is clear: the “truer interpretation of nature is accomplished by 
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means of instances, and apt and appropriate experiments, where the sense 
judges only the experiment while the experiment judges nature and the thing 
itself.”82 Bacon’s words clearly refute Popper and Hesse’s contention that the 
mind can be purged of its idols. A remedy for the idols of the tribe is to devise 
extrinsic experiments for the intrinsically inadequate senses. He is not saying, 
however, that were the senses acute and adequate, the senses would be 
sufficient in the judgment of nature. He is equally not saying that the 
experimentally assisted senses will be able to flatten the mirror of the mind and, 
thus, “receive the natural light unrefracted.”83 It is true that we would see more 
clearly, but following Urbach’s interpretation, the senses are only to judge the 
experiment. That is, Bacon suggests that “the senses cannot decide on the truth 
of the axioms since these will typically involve unobservable entities but they 
determine the outcome of experiments, that is, the truth of observation 
statements derivable from the axioms.”84 Urbach’s interpretation follows from 
what Bacon says about the “forms”: “forms are fictions of the human soul, except 
when you want to call those laws governing the act forms.”85 It would be absurd 
therefore to think that these laws of action are themselves sensible directly. It is 
even more absurd to think that better and clearer lenses can simply correct the 
“permanent” errors of the mind.  
 We see that the idols of the tribe are, indeed, innate. Remedies cannot 
purge them. There are remedies to help the senses, for example. However, the 
intellect will still be an uneven surface contaminated by “its preconceptions, its 
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narrowness, its restlessness,” and its affections.86 Bacon draws to our attention 
these innate idols so that we can be on guard against them. We can recognize 
but not eradicate them.  
 
 
Idols of the Cave 
 
Neither Bacon nor commentators have much to say about the idols of the cave. 
They arise from an individual’s idiosyncrasies, “both body and soul, as well as 
from education, custom, and accident.”87 They are relatively benign, but the idols 
of the cave are also the causes of great errors. According to Bacon, priority 
Aristotle placed in logic in his philosophy rendered his non-logical works “virtually 
useless.”88 Similarly, after formulating many experiments on the magnet, Gilbert 
“immediately fabricated a philosophy conforming to this mastering passion”: he 
made the magnetic force the breath of earth and all the heavenly spheres’ souls; 
consequently, the magnetic force and animate form of the globes exert “an 
unending action, quick, definite, constant, directive, motive, imperant, 
harmonious, through the whole mass of matter” and “thereby are the generation 
and ultimate decay of all things on the superficies propagated.”89 This kind of 
generalizing from particulars to axioms is what Bacon finds specifically 
detrimental to the progression of the sciences. However, Leucippus and 
Democritus are guilty of looking too closely at the particulars, and they ended up 
ignoring the structures.90 Bacon recommends the adoption of a “contemplative 
strategy…to restrain and drive off the Idols of the Cave”: we must alternate 
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between the particulars and the general “to make the intellect at once penetrating 
and comprehensive.” 91  In other words, neither must we be misled by our 
proclivities nor by the particulars at the expense of the general or the general at 
the expense of the particulars.  
 
 
Idols of the Market  
 
The idols of the market are the “greatest nuisances of the lot” and “have slipped 
into the intellect through the alliance of words and names.”92 They are the idols of 
words and meaning. The relation between reason and words is reciprocal: “men 
believe that their reason rules words but it also happens that words turn and 
bend their power back upon the intellect.”93 The problem, as Feyerabend sees it, 
is that human beings using language L, for example, “will interpret the descriptive 
signs of this language in a way which depends upon their ‘prejudices’ (in Bacon’s 
sense) i.e. upon their general ideas about things and their properties.”94 But 
Feyerabend, like Bacon, finds that a comprehensive view of the intellect that is 
based solely on the use of words is only possible in simple cases; although he 
thinks there is more complexity in the matter, he does have much sympathy with  
[T]he view formulated clearly and elegantly by Whorf (and anticipated by 
Bacon), that languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not 
merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of affairs), but that 
they are also shapers of events (facts, states of affairs), that their 
‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of 
society, or the situations of man which influences thought, behaviour, 
perception.95    
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This is the position taken by many twentieth-century thinkers and professors of 
philosophy, but rather than making it an aspect of a skepticism akin to Bacon’s, 
they took language to be the only means to reach a comprehensive view of the 
world. What Bacon anticipated was the intractable problems of language. Not 
only were they mostly “imposed according to common capacity,” but the 
controversies that stemmed from the vagueness, the different uses, and the 
different meanings, of words could not be solved by reductions to definitions, for 
definitions are “made up of words, and words beget words.”96 The two central 
issues that arise with words are that their referents either can be vague or 
nonexistent. Words like “fortune, first mover, planetary orbs, [and] the element of 
fire” are “fictions…whose origins lie in vain and deceitful theories." A word like 
moist, “which springs from wrong-headed and ignorant abstraction,” is an 
example of the other kind.  
 Bacon addressed earlier the problem of causes that arises with regard to 
nature. Fortune is the exertion of an external force on human affairs, for the 
prime mover is the first cause of all causes; it is the initial movement of all 
movement; it is the hand of God—or perhaps God Himself—and the planetary 
orbs are often referred to as the heavens. Bacon clearly does not imply that the 
planetary orbits are imaginary. The separation between the natural and the 
imaginary is again made explicit. Here, one might think the fictitious stands in for 
the divine. Although not stated outright, there is an implication that fate, God, and 
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the heavens do not exist: they are merely empty terms floating in the void of 
linguistic error. 
 
 
Idols of the Theater 
 
At last we come to the only idols that are not innate, and thus, capable of being 
purged from the minds of men. The fact that Bacon’s treatment of the idols of the 
theater is longer than the others not only indicates that we can purge these idols, 
but also that we must purge these idols if we are to take up the mantle of his 
scientific enterprise. It is no surprise that Bacon’s attack on the ancients in the 
Masculine Birth of Time is consistent with his presentation of the idols of the 
theater. They are idols that have “clearly been promoted and given credit by 
theories fit for the stage and by misguided laws of demonstration.”97 The specific 
kinds of “false philosophy” that Bacon has in mind, which have been complicit in 
falsehood, are the sophistical, the empirical, and the superstitious.98 It follows 
that, although these idols are extrinsic, they are systematic representations of the 
three innate idols. In other words, the proclivity to establish a new sect or follow 
one of these false philosophies may be innate—a mixture of the first three kinds 
of idols.  
 Unsurprisingly, Bacon names Aristotle as “the most obvious example” of a 
sophist. Aristotle’s “dialectic corrupted natural philosophy when he fashioned the 
world from categories…and forced on the nature of things countless other ideas 
as the whim took him.”99 Aristotle bent experience to match his preconceived 
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opinions, and accordingly, his so-called experimental works are no different from 
his works on logic. They seek to prove their premises regardless of any 
intermediate contrary. The work, then, of the sophists merely relates and 
contributes to the idols of the market. They dispute about disputations and 
produce nothing but further disputations.  
We see that the error of the empirics is to generalize a comprehensive 
view of things on the basis of only a few experiments, and Bacon once again puts 
Gilbert’s philosophy into this school. Bacon warns us that this philosophy is even 
more “deformed and monstrous” than the sophistical “because of the premature 
and precipitate onrush of the intellect and its tendency to jump the gun and fly off 
towards the generalities and principles of things, terrible danger may well arise 
from philosophies of this kind.”100 He does not, however, speak to what the 
danger may be or consist of. The danger might be of a doctrinal nature—and 
therefore merely concern disputations between schools—but we also have to 
consider the fact that a purely empirical science does not seek lights; since lights 
bear fruits and fruits bear lights, the empiricists may lack the requisite capacity to 
seek further progress from progress: “all utility and capacity for producing works 
lies in intermediate causes.”101 These are the causes that the empiricists do not 
investigate.  
However, the most widespread and greatest danger to philosophy is 
superstition. While the sophistical “ensnares the intellect,” the superstitious 
“deludes it.”102 Make no mistake: Bacon is explicitly speaking of the superstitious 
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mixed with “theology.”  Bacon initially uses Pythagoras and Plato as examples of 
thinkers who were prone to this error but then opens up his criticism even to 
those who “have tried to build a natural philosophy on the first chapter of 
Genesis…and other sacred writings.”103He reminds us again to leave to faith that 
which is faith’s. The problem is that it is unhealthy to mix the divine and the 
human as such a mixture “begets not only fantastic philosophy but heretical 
religion.”104 But, by looking back to aphorism twenty-three, we see that Bacon is 
not merely issuing his command to leave faith to that which is faith’s. In aphorism 
twenty-three, Bacon states that there is a great “gulf between the Idols of the 
human mind and the ideas of the divine” (between empty opinions and “true 
signatures or impressions stamped on created things as we find them”).105 But by 
aphorism sixty-five, any attempt to bridge this gap, the great gulf, is “unhealthy” 
and “heretical.” We are right to wonder if theology itself is not some mixture of the 
human and divine. But more specifically, there is a certain theology that claims 
that there was at some point the actual mixture of the human and divine; and the 
embodiment of this mixture is Jesus as the supreme revelation of God. Bacon’s 
attack on superstition indirectly indicts Christianity, and we need to read between 
the lines in the following chapter to grasp the possibility that Bacon’s critique of 
Aristotle and Plato also acts as a subversion of Christianity on behalf of his 
science.  In sum, Bacon attacks the three schools of thought for relying on vulgar 
notions, on two few experiments, and on superstition.106  
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However, these philosophies are also reckless in how they “grant and 
withhold assent.”107 This recklessness contributes to the perpetuation of the idols. 
On the one hand, Aristotle’s philosophy is too sure of the correctness of its logic 
and, therefore, polishes everything off “without a trace of uncertainty.”108 This 
certainty prevents anyone from questioning the method of using logic as a means 
of validating or invalidating what is truth or falsity. The problem of deduction is 
that the conclusion of an argument can be true even if its premises are false. The 
validity of an argument is not concerned with true or falsity. It is only concerned 
with self-consistency. On the other hand, through “witticism and irony” Plato 
helped provide the building materials for the New Academy’s Acatalepsy.109 
According to Bacon, the New Academy’s approach is more honest than 
Aristotle’s because it does not “lay down the law”; it instead “holds consequences 
to be probable without having them be regarded as true.”110 However, this sect 
deprives man of the hope of discovering truth. Like Aristotelianism, this 
deprivation leads to fruitless arguments rather than rigorous inquiry.111  
Bacon concludes his section on the individual kinds of idols with another 
exhortation to free and purge the intellect of its idols.112 So as Urbach remarks 
above, we, like Popper and Hesse, are confronted with another gloss of the idols 
that seems to support their views of the possibility that the mind can eradicate its 
idols. Taken in isolation, their interpretation of what Bacon means here would be 
enticing. But right before Bacon tell us that the intellect must be “thoroughly freed 
and purged” of the idols, he relates to us that the “authority of human sense and 
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intellect should not, for all their weakness, be despised but furnished with 
help.”113 It is clear that the sense and intellect logically cannot both be purged of 
their idols and furnished with help to avoid falling for the traps of their inherent 
weaknesses. We again see why it is so important to read Bacon carefully. For he 
states outright that entrance into the “Kingdom of Man, which is founded on the 
sciences, differs little from that into the Kingdom of Heaven, into which none 
enters except in the likeness of a little child.”114 At first sight, Bacon simply seems 
to compare his Kingdom of Man with what Jesus tell us about entrance into the 
Kingdom of Heaven in Mark 10:15. The problem is that the passage in Mark does 
not refer to the kingdom of heaven but the kingdom of God: “Whoever does not 
receive the kingdom of God / Like a child / Will never enter therein.”115Bacon 
might have misquoted the passage. However, as we mentioned in Chapter Two, 
there is a prominent tradition that believes the kingdom of heaven is the same as 
the Church.116And the kingdom of God is thought to be different from the kingdom 
of heaven. Why then does Bacon alter the biblical reference? Perhaps because 
the Kingdom of Man is intended not only to subvert the kingdom of heaven on 
earth (that is, Christianity), but also to replace it. It is important to remember that 
Bacon furnishes the authority of the sense and intellect; he does not despise this 
authority. The idols of the tribe, however, are the only idols that can be “forsworn 
and renounced with unwavering and solemn resolve.” And so once again, Bacon 
uses religious sentiments to help him to secularize his project.  
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Chapter Four 
The End of Destruction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first book of the New Organon presents Bacon’s case for why an instauration 
of the arts and sciences is needed. As we noted earlier, this new beginning aims 
first for light and only later for fruit. However, before Bacon can implement his 
vision of a new world, which stands on firm ground, he must dismantle the 
prevailing and imaginary philosophical systems that, more or less, have 
remained the same since their inception in antiquity. This dismantling, however, 
is complicated. Not only do the ancients like Plato and Aristotle continue to 
govern the schools, but Christian theology also rules over the minds of men. 
Bacon cannot merely point out certain deficiencies of philosophical and 
theological thought, which is the purpose of his doctrine of idols. He must also 
refute these very systems. Indeed, this dismantling of the idols of the theater is 
the issue that occupies the majority of the first book of the New Organon. Unlike 
his refutations of philosophies, however, Bacon must treat the theological 
obstacle more carefully and delicately. He cannot appear impious. Within many 
of his discussions of the ancients, he implies—or sometimes states—analogies 
to Christianity. His refutations of the ancient doctrines might, perhaps, be less 
severe had it not been for their great influence on Christianity. The objective of 
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the following study is to look at what Bacon thinks are the root causes of the 
retardation of the arts and sciences.   
It might be said that Bacon’s presentation of the innate idols serves two 
purposes. The first and more obvious reason is to show the natural deficiencies 
of man, which then signifies that the senses and intellect need helps. However, 
the second and less obvious reason is to keep the “honour of the ancients and of 
all the rest…unimpaired”; he is “not comparing wits and faculties but ways” and 
he does “not take on the guise of a judge but the likeness of a guide.”1 In other 
words, by showing that every man’s sense and intellect are faulty, Bacon can 
excuse Plato and Aristotle, for example for their erroneous philosophies. He can, 
therefore, keep their honor intact, and at the same time, dismantle their 
philosophies. In the Refutation of Philosophies, Bacon indeed states that 
anybody “who does not place [Plato and Aristotle] among the greatest human 
minds has failed in understanding or in candour.”2 Even the greatest minds are 
like uneven mirrors. And since they do not realize their deficiencies, they sink 
deeper and deeper into the comfort of their caves. The first step is to understand 
the “signs” that show that “current philosophies and studies are in a bad way” 
and the “causes” of the “incredible and surprising” present state of affairs: for 
“understanding of the signs opens the way to assent…and explanation of the 
causes takes away the surprise.” 3 The “signs” are signs of the ancients’ errors. 
The “causes” are the causes of these errors, and that which is “incredible” and 
“surprising” is the fact that no progress has been made in correcting the errors 
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nor has there been any great advancement of the sciences in “twenty-five 
centuries.” 4  Bacon’s sketch of the signs and causes of the errors of the 
philosophies is itself a history of philosophy. This is what Strauss alludes to 
above when he claims that the “turning to history…finds its most complete 
expression in Bacon’s philosophy.” Bacon presents to us the first history of 
philosophy in his refutation of philosophy, and the turn to history itself is a special 
kind of history of philosophy. It seems to presuppose philosophical ages, 
dominating states of mind, and world pictures.  
It might be that, taken in isolation, the ancient philosophers and their 
philosophies are benign. Perhaps, they could have been merely murals of the 
wall of history and tales of times past. However, the fact that they have stuck 
around is cause for concern: “the wisdom of the Greeks was professorial and 
poured forth in disputations, a kind which is quite inimical to the investigation of 
truth.”5 Like in his description of the idols of the theater, Bacon places Plato and 
Aristotle among the sophists. He also adds Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and 
their successors to his list of sophists. 6 Alluding to what Dionysius says of Plato 
in the Seventh Letter, Bacon derides all of their sophistical doctrines as “the 
words of useless old men to inexperienced young ones.”7 In twenty-five hundred 
years, there have only been six centuries that were “productive of sciences and 
helpful to their advancement.”8 He is almost certainly speaking of the more-
ancient Greek period. That is, the more-ancient Greeks (Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, 
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Philolaus, and the rest) “got on with their pursuit of truth more quietly, rigorously, 
and simply” than the sophists above.  However, they were not even “immune to 
their national weakness” of setting up sets and seeking favor from the public.9 
Faulkner explains their failings in the following passage: 
The point is that these pre-Socratics supposed that knowledge is possible 
through the ratio of fundamental bodies, however this varies from sense-
perception itself, and that they also thought that the knowing of such 
fundamentals was in itself the most serious human activity. That is, they 
also supposed themselves knowledgeable about the goods of the human 
world…Bacon, however, thought that the doctrines of the pre-Socratics 
were contradictory, that is, that their materialism was contradicted by their 
rationalism.10 
 
Lampert, however, thinks that Bacon “implies that his own thought is a return to 
the pre-Socratic philosophers.”11Faulkner’s position, nevertheless, is in line with 
Bacon’s criticisms of the more ancient Greeks. In other words, the objects of their 
focus were better than the sophists, but they were still prone to the same 
“national weakness,” and even their philosophies deviated “into this sort of 
nonsense [that of setting up sects and courting public favour].”12  
Bacon again compares the Greeks to children; they talk but do not 
generate.13 Although the comparison of the Greeks to children is straightforward, 
it is worrying that we are reminded of Bacon’s earlier statement that we must 
enter the Kingdom of Man in the likeness of a child. The Greeks were children, 
yet we must also be like children. Can he have it both ways? Did Bacon not 
admonish the Greeks for being children? We must also ask what Bacon’s 
contemporaries are: are they children? It does not appear so (if they have to 
enter the kingdom of man like children). In a way, Lampert might be partially 
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correct in saying that Bacon wishes to return the minds of men to those more 
ancient times before they were corrupted by philosophies and theologies. 
However, Faulkner is correct in his assessment of those more ancient Greeks. 
Bacon states explicitly that even in those more ancient periods “when men’s 
intelligence and letters flourished most or at least tolerably well, natural 
philosophy absorbed very little of their energies.” 14  He does refer to their 
philosophy as the “great mother of the sciences,” but he clearly does not imply, 
as Lampert thinks he does, that “his own thought is a return to the pre-Socratic 
philosophers.”15  
The more ancient Greeks correctly looked to nature, but they still produced 
no fruits. Among the “signs none is more certain or noble than that derived from 
fruits,” and the “discovery of fruits and works as it were guarantees and 
underwrites the truth of philosophy.”16 In other words, the more ancient Greeks 
were right about their object of inquiry but did not produce anything useful, 
whereas the less ancient Greeks neither looked at the right things nor produced 
anything. If philosophies are sound, they should grow and progress. If they are 
based solely on the opinions of men, they are barren. Similarly, philosophies that 
claim that the possibility of knowledge is impossible because of the “subtlety of 
nature, the obscurity of things, and the weakness of the human wit” betray 
themselves.17 In other words, if the statement that one cannot know anything 
were true, it could not have been made.18 That is, such a statement implies that 
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one has knowledge about which his statement claims he cannot have. These are 
“dogmas which are not merely desperate but actually dedicated to despair.”19   
The consent commanded by the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is by 
no means an indication of their depth or superiority to other ancient doctrines that 
have not survived. Because the more ancient philosophers were well known in 
the Roman Empire, Bacon blames the loss of their works and the survival of 
Plato and Aristotle’s works on the barbarian takeover of Rome: “when the 
barbarian flood burst into the Roman Empire and human learning suffered 
shipwreck, the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato were, like timbers of lighter and 
less solid matter, saved from time’s breakers.”20 That Plato and Aristotle’s works 
were all that remained (mostly) intact does not mean that they are more valuable 
than those that were lost. It means instead that they were easier for the vulgar to 
understand than the other deeper philosophies. Aristotle commands consent not 
because agreement was reached by free judgments but because people have 
“surrendered themselves to it on the precedent and authority of others.”21 Bacon 
finds that consent is an indication that one’s judgment has gone awry, and claims 
that the “worst of all omens in intellectual matters is taken from consent. The only 
areas where consent is not the worst omen is in divinity and in politics. However, 
given the fact that logic, ethics, and politics are to be transformed under Bacon’s 
project, it is very likely that Bacon is not being upfront with the exclusion of 
politics and religion from his critique of consent. If one were to argue that his 
judgment tells us that Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies are not light and 
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sophistical, as Bacon claims, but are, in fact, deep and offer the intellect a great 
many rewards, Bacon would point to his previous signs of philosophical errors. 
The very lack of rewards reaped from Plato and Aristotle belies any supposed 
admiration for them.  
We now come to the reasons (the causes of) why these errors have lasted 
for so many ages. His presentation is certainly an historical account of 
philosophy, and like his system of skepticism (the doctrine of idols), this history of 
philosophy was altogether new but is now a commonplace in modern 
philosophical works. According to Bacon, there are only three great revolutions of 
learning: those of the Greeks, the Romans, and the Western Europeans.22 It is 
also clear that the first two revolutions have been subsumed under the third. For 
two thousand years, the “sciences have got bogged down and stayed pretty 
much where they were with no notable progress at all.”23 Only a couple centuries 
of learning “can be properly allotted” to each revolution. The cause of the 
stagnation of the advancement of the sciences in each revolution is “the 
shortness of time favourable to them.”24 In other words, each revolution faced a 
predicament or obstacle to the advancement of learning. As we saw above, 
during the Greek age “natural philosophy absorbed very little of [the 
philosophers’] energies.” In the Roman age, “the philosophers’ hardest thinking 
and best efforts were engaged and spent on moral philosophy” and political 
affairs. Finally, in the age of the Western Europeans, “by far the greatest number 
of the most outstanding minds gave themselves to theology.”25 The period in 
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which natural philosophy flourished most was that of the more ancient Greeks. 
Even in this early period, the so-called Seven Wise Men (save Thales) “devoted 
themselves to moral philosophy and civil affairs,” and “after Socrates had brought 
philosophy down from the heavens to the Earth, moral philosophy was even 
more popular, and turned men’s minds away from natural philosophy.”26   
The term “pre-Socratic,” which was used by both Faulkner and Lampert, 
does not appear in Bacon’s description of the more ancient philosophers. We 
have likewise omitted the term until now. Bacon’s reference to Socrates above is 
the only place in the entire New Organon in which Socrates is mentioned. Yet, 
we see that what held each revolution back is that the best minds concerned 
themselves with some form of moral philosophy. Above we saw that Bacon 
excluded Thales from the list of the Seven Wise Men who devoted themselves to 
moral philosophy. Accordingly, Hans Blumenberg gives an account of Bacon’s 
“irritation at the configuration forged in the Thales anecdote”:  
In the autumn of 1624, while Bacon was recuperating from a serious 
illness, he dictated a set of apothegms from memory; among them, a 
variant on the Thales anecdote. It emphasizes the polysemy of Thales’ 
doxographically eminent relation to water: he did not need to fall into the 
water to observe the stars; looking at the water and seeing their reflection 
would have sufficed. Doing what he did, however, he would not have 
been able to learn anything about water since he only looked upward at 
the stars. The impression is barely avoidable that Bacon alters and 
extends the anecdote through associations that evoke the 
protophilosopher’s double character: both as the star gazer who 
dismisses the mediated optics of reflection and as the inventor of the first 
cosmogony from one unifying principle, that of water, the confirmation of 
which he experiences in a crude way, by falling into it.27  
 
The purpose of Bacon’s retelling of the fable28 is to show that the star gazing 
Thales looked to those things “where man has no power of operating but only of 
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knowing,” and found instead that the “investigation of fact itself or of the truth of 
the matter…must be traced back to those primary and catholic axioms 
concerning simple natures.”29 It is easy to see, in Blumenberg’s account of 
Thales’s double character, the kind of cosmogony that Bacon rejects. This double 
character results in the pre-Socratic contradiction that Faulkner speaks of above 
(the contradiction between their materialism and rationalism). What Bacon wants 
to show, however, is that the “vulgar, vile, or very subtle” things must be included 
in the investigation of nature.30  
 It was the Socratic turn that bogged down the sciences. Socrates is the 
real culprit behind the stagnation of the sciences. In Aristophanes’ Clouds and 
Plato’s Parmenides and Phaedo, we have three accounts of Socrates’ initial 
interest in natural philosophy. Aristophanes’s comically slanderous account of 
Socrates’ natural philosophy is brought against Socrates in Plato’s Apology as 
evidence of his atheism. However, in Plato’s accounts, which we will focus on 
here, we see a young Socrates and an old Socrates. In the Parmenides, 
Socrates laments that he has “hit a dead end many times” over whether to speak 
the same or differently about the form of Man and the form of fire or 
water.31Parmenides then asks Socrates whether “those things that would seem 
to be laughable, such as Hair and Mud and Dirt or any different thing that’s very 
worthless and lowly” also have forms.32 Socrates answers, “No, not at all,” for 
“these things are as we see them right here, and it would be grossly out of place 
to think that there is some form of them.”33 These are the exact kinds of things 
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that Bacon tells us to investigate. In the Phaedo, Socrates tells those present in 
his final hours of his initial interest in natural philosophy but also the reasons for 
his turning away from natural philosophy. This is a brief excerpt from the 
discussion:  
“Listen then and I shall tell you. For I, Cebes,” he said, “as a young man 
was wondrously desirous of that wisdom they call ‘inquiry into nature.’ 
This wisdom seemed to me grandiose—to know the causes of each thing, 
why each thing comes to be and why it perishes and why it is; and very 
often I cast my thought to and fro looking first of all into questions like 
these: Is it when hot and cold bring about a certain fermentation as some 
people say, that animals grow into organisms? And is the blood that by 
which we’re thoughtful? Or is it air or fire? Or is it none of these, and is it 
the brain that produces the senses of hearing and seeing and smelling; 
and would memory and opinion arise out of these, and in this way out of 
memory and opinion brought to a state of rest arises knowledge? And 
then in turn I looked into the processes by which these things pass away 
and the affections that pertain to heaven and earth, until I ended up with 
the opinion that my natural fitness for this ‘looking into things’ was next to 
nothing…Well then after these experiences,” said he, “since I had had it 
with this looking into beings…it seemed to me that I should take refuge in 
accounts and look in them for the truth of beings.”34  
 
Bacon utterly rejects this turn to accounts even more than what Socrates’s 
insistence that the filthy are without forms. At least in the Parmenides, Socrates 
shows interest in natural philosophy. However, in the Phaedo, Socrates explains 
why he turned from natural philosophy to human accounts. This turn to speech or 
accounts is what eventually led to the turn to moral and political philosophy. This 
is what Bacon means by saying that Socrates brought philosophy down from the 
heavens to the earth. Socrates cut the sciences off from their roots, and because 
of this, “it is no wonder that they do not grow.”35 To sum up, the divine and the 
human were separated before Socrates brought the divine down to earth by 
turning to accounts; but after this turn, the way was open for moral accounts to 
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thrive in philosophy. His justifications for his turn to accounts cut off philosophy 
from its proper path. The Romans had practical reasons for turning to politics, for 
the “sheer size of the Roman Empire required many men’s services.”36 Like the 
Greeks, however, the Roman preoccupation with moral philosophy finds its origin 
in the Socratic turn. Christian theology used Plato’s mixture of philosophy and 
theology and Aristotle’s logic, which supported itself and advocated for its use in 
solving questions through its own system of disputation. Lampert finds that, in 
attacking Plato and Aristotle, Bacon is also attacking the edifice that supported 
their philosophies: “these systems were preserved because they proved 
serviceable to the natural theology of Christianity, that greatest inundation into 
the Roman Empire.” In other words, Christianity drowned the natural philosophy 
of the pre-Socratics because it threatened the very enterprise of and reason for 
religion.   
 Leo Strauss finds that Bacon “starts from the premise that moral 
philosophy as the theory of virtue and duty has been perfectly worked out by 
classical philosophy.”37 That is not to say that Bacon kept or adhered to the 
classical moral philosophy. In fact, we see that Bacon desired to render ancient 
political philosophy utterly superfluous by “perfecting the other sciences—logic, 
ethics, and polices—by taking the route” he has mapped out.38 Travis D. Smith is 
correct in his assessment that Bacon wishes to imitate Jesus, but this is not all 
that Bacon implies.39 Socrates is only relevant because of how classical moral 
and political philosophy fits into Christian theology. The implication as to why the 
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other philosophies were lost is that Christianity destroyed them. They were 
dangerous to Christianity. Moral and political philosophy props up Christianity 
with its fruitless arguments and lack of ambitions.  
 When Socrates pulled philosophy down from heaven to earth, he came as 
a serpent or, perhaps, as Satan himself. By turning to accounts, we see that the 
moral and the political became the emphasis of philosophy. That is not to say 
that the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle are only concerned with 
moral and political issues. It is to say that, like Satan, Socrates was able to turn 
the mind of man to accounts of the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, 
and the noble and the wicked. One might say that Socrates lit the way to the Tree 
of Knowledge while he neglected the Tree of Life.  
The Romans focused primarily on moral philosophy and civic affairs. 
Rather than the philosophical, Bacon speaks of the practical aspects of Roman 
politics. They cared about the administration of their empire and not about 
questioning it. In the Roman Empire, there was one political system, and thus, 
political philosophy either endangered its existence or was superfluous. This 
would explain why the Romans took up practical politics rather than theoretical.   
Western Europeans are not children like the Greeks were. They are aware 
of their sins. This awareness was made popular by Jesus but was prepared for 
by Socrates. Bacon tells us that the “ancient sciences have acquired a great deal 
of prestige and credit from the vanity and folly of those who have set out new 
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ones.”40 The people who have set out the “new one” are “idle boasters and 
cranks,” who have “loaded the human race with [thirteen] promises”: 
Guaranteeing and holding out the prospect of prolonging life, delaying old 
age, relieving pain, making good natural defects, deceiving the senses, 
binding and stimulating the affections, illuminating and extending the 
intellectual faculties, transmuting substances, reinforcing and multiplying 
motions at will, making impressions and alterations on the air, drawing 
down and managing celestial influences, foretelling things to come, 
representing things distant, revealing things hidden, and so on ad 
infinitum.41 
 
We see that Jesus made a great many of these promises. He promised 
everlasting life, he relieved pain, he bound and stimulated the hearts of men to 
God, he brought faith into the intellect, he promised the transmutation of 
substances, and so on and so forth. Bacon rejects all of these promises and, in 
reiterating them, he means to show that they are nonsensical. He draws a 
distinction between these lavish promises and the actual deeds of Julius Caesar 
and Alexander the Great. Bacon contrasts the actual deeds of these two great 
conquerors with the imaginary fables of Amadis of Gaul and Arthur of Britain.42 
The former men were pagans while the latter were said to be devout Christians. 
Perhaps the reason that Jesus is not one of Bacon’s conquerors is because 
Bacon puts him in the same category as Amadis and Arthur, for it is truly religion, 
“which has such influence over men’s souls,” that has held back the growth of 
natural philosophy.43  
 The attack on the Socratic turn is not merely a covert attack on Christianity 
but also truly an attack on the turning of philosophy to accounts in speech. Bacon 
points out that all of the discoveries in the mechanical arts “are more ancient than 
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philosophy and the intellectual arts, so that (if the truth be told) when the rational 
and dogmatic sciences got started, the discovery of useful works came to a 
standstill.”44 In other words, the Socratic turn is what turned man away from the 
useful and toward the rational (in terms of looking at accounts). As we have seen, 
pure rationalism only leads to fantasy and distortions of the world and its things. 
Although Bacon offers us numerous hopes to think that progress will come in 
following his project, he also offers the following thought: 
Lastly, even if the breath of hope blowing from that new continent were 
much weaker and less perceptible, yet I have decided that (unless we 
evidently wish to be mean of soul) we must make the attempt. For not to 
try and not to succeed are quite different risks, for by not trying we cast 
aside an immense good but by not succeeding we lose a little human 
labour. But from what I have said, and also from what I have not, it seems 
to me that we have a great deal of hope, not only to persuade a keen man 
to have a go, but also to make a wise and moderate man believe in it.45  
  
Bacon truly wishes to replace the promises of Christianity with the promise of 
science. The philosophical systems must also be “utterly destroyed.”46 The arts 
are to serve the future of all humanity, for “no empire, no sect, and no star seems 
to have exerted a greater effect and influence on human affairs 
than…mechanical innovations.”47 Also, it is the greatest human ambition to strive 
to renew and increase the “empire of humanity itself over the whole universe of 
things,” and the empire of man over nature lies in the arts and sciences alone.48 
These are the aims and promises of Bacon.  
 According to Kennington, the reason that Bacon emphasized charity, that 
is, philanthropy, is that Bacon “learned from Machiavelli that unarmed prophets, if 
armed with the right doctrines, can succeed.”49 Bacon borrowed the Christian 
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teaching on charity, “in order to consecrate the mastery of nature.”50 Charity, 
then, becomes philanthropy. As we have seen earlier, attaching a philanthropic 
end enables Bacon to seek the support of the vulgar, those people whom the 
fruits of the project will benefit. He, thus, entices the select few, those men with 
great intellects, to take up the reins of his project by loosening the grip on truth 
and knowledge from philosophies and theologies. Lampert explains that Bacon 
“reverses the Socratic turn set out in the Phaedo, the turn away from natural 
philosophy to the logoi” because the turn has been captured “by a misologic and 
misanthropic religion.”51 This is a similar sentiment to what Strauss said above, 
namely that Bacon found that moral philosophy had been perfectly worked out by 
classical philosophy. Therefore, we see that Bacon’s purpose of using the 
Christian value of charity was to undermine Christianity. Lampert claims that 
Bacon is not one “who no longer knows what religions are good for,” and thus, 
“Baconianism is a utopianism promulgated by a great realist.”52   
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As man becomes a God to man and to nature not only is religion no longer 
necessary but the entire framework of morality is no longer founded on how man 
ought to act but “as we actually find it and not as someone’s own private reason 
hands it down to him.” 1  As we have seen, Bacon dismisses classical and 
scholastic philosophical systems as apish patterns of arbitrary abstractions that 
man’s idiosyncrasies and imaginations have jumbled together. Bacon intends his 
instauration not only to reform the minds of men but also to establish and 
promote a criterion of truth that leads to causal knowledge that is prepared for 
and tested by works. He expresses this sentiment near the end of the first book 
of the New Organon: 
So let men know (as I have said above) how great is the gulf between the 
Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the divine. For the former are 
nothing more than abstractions made arbitrarily, whereas the latter are 
authentic seals that the Creator has stamped upon his creatures 
according as they are impressed and defined in matter by true and exact 
lines. Thus truth and utility are (in this situation) the very things 
themselves; and the very works give much more as guarantors of the 
truth, than providers of material benefits.2 
 
What is unique to Bacon is that he wrests the word “truth” from its familiar 
philosophical surroundings and seems to relegate it to a secondary role as an 
equal to “the very things themselves” and “utility.” Bacon does not advocate or 
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prepare the way for some proto-pragmatism. The “true and exact lines” that are 
“impressed” and “defined” in “the very things themselves” are not phantasms of a 
purely utilitarian undertaking. Rather, Bacon redirects the mind from its empty 
notions and theories to the “true pattern of the world as we actually find it.”3 It 
seems as though Bacon endorses a position that takes seriously the possibility of 
an intelligible nature that obeys discoverable natural laws. Bacon may have 
simply stripped “truth” of its abstract character, and instead fused the thing with 
the true.  
However, Bacon also makes a surprising admission: “the very 
contemplation of things as they are without superstition or imposture, error or 
confusion, [is] intrinsically more worth than all the fruits of discoveries.”4 As 
Kennington points out, there is much confusion about this statement if we 
understand it with respect to the quotation above. However, Bacon is not 
speaking of the ancient form of contemplation but rather contemplation in terms 
of an actual understanding of the processes of the world at the exclusion of the 
final causes that are “the defect of the ancient contemplative way.” 5  A 
contemplation of this sort might be a physicist’s understanding of quantum 
physics, a biologist’s understanding of evolution, a chemist’s understanding of 
chemical reactions, and so forth. Strauss also finds that the modern project as 
understood by Bacon “demands that man should become the master and owner 
of nature or that philosophy or science should cease to be essentially 
theoretical,” that is, the utter destruction of philosophy.6  
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The focus on natural processes not only leads to new knowledge but also, 
and most importantly, to new abilities to test and verify our knowledge of these 
processes. It is still not clear how the contemplation of processes is compatible 
with Strauss’s assertion that Bacon’s sciences is not essentially theoretical. 
Bacon, however, provides a clue to his thinking in the final lines from Book One: 
I do not affirm that nothing can be added to what I prescribe; on the 
contrary, as one who observes the mind not only in its innate capacity but 
also insofar as it gets to grips with things, it is my conviction that the art of 
discovering will grow as the number of things discovered grows.7  
 
Bacon seems to imply that the very nature of the mind will change as human 
begins change the nature of things. This might mean that the very contemplation 
of things is itself a kind of invention of things. The contemplation of processes 
means, then, understanding how to generate and superinduce new natures, and 
this process, in turn, alters the very nature of the mind. And we can see that the 
contemplation of processes is itself a kind of discovering. In other words, the 
contemplation of things is to understand not only how they are but also how to 
generate or alter them. The processes of nature are the forces of creation, and 
as we harness these forces, we become creators not merely of new natures but 
of an entirely new Nature.  
  We have seen that, because Bacon’s method has universal application, its 
methods, measures, and means of evaluation holds jurisdiction over the human 
sciences. He foresaw the dominion of man over nature. The arts and sciences 
alone determine the empire of man over things. The aim of human power is to 
generate and superinduce new natures. The ways to human power and 
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knowledge are almost identical; yet, the speculative department is accustomed to 
meddling with abstractions and, thus, must be bounded by the active department. 
And lastly, Bacon tells us that the prescriptions for the active and the 
contemplative departments are the same thing, “for what is most useful in 
operating, is most true in knowing.”8  
However, what is most mentioned about Bacon’s project is the need, even 
in the modern age, of his system of skepticism. The “helps” Bacon provides do 
not eradicate the idols of the mind; and even if the classical philosophies and 
modern theologies were abandoned, there would still be new systematic 
representations of the world and its processes. It must be stressed that Bacon’s 
doctrine of idols is a system of refutation that need not be forgotten. Modern 
science is, essentially, founded on the idea that all theories must be able to be 
refuted, and the same difficulties and obstacles that presented themselves in 
Bacon’s time are present today. Paul Feyerabend explains this notion in the 
following way: 
Theories, pictures of the world, are not unchangeable and absolute truths; 
rather, they are attempts by thinking by [sic] imperfect human beings to 
understand the world surrounding them. The expectation that the pictures 
possess a kernel of truth cannot be justified. There is no authority whose 
communications can replace our lack of knowledge. Experience, too, is 
ultimately only a human event, and, as such, subject to mistakes and 
criticism. Theories must be developed in a form that makes them easily 
open to criticism, and must then be criticized relentlessly. Certainty, ‘sure 
results’, are neither achievable nor desirable. The proof that a result is 
‘secure’ is at the same time a proof it is not objectively relevant. Even long 
acceptance is no sign of truth; an obvious weakness might have been 
overlooked due to prejudice or lack of multifaceted criticism. This is, 
basically, the scientific method…Philosophy, to name only one discipline, 
has made it its task since Plato to reintroduce mythical thought in a 
rational form, that is with greater cleverness. In physics, however, ever 
since the so-called ‘scientific revolution’ of the 16th and 17th centuries, the 
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situation became very complicated. In words one says one thing, and in 
practice does something completely different, trying to reinterpret facts 
according to the words, which does not happen [sic] without violence and 
distortion. To put it in a more concrete way: just as the Ionians did, men of 
the present invent bold theories for which they have no justification and 
which are by no means appropriate to give dogmatic certainty. But they 
present these theories as if they had derived them from authority. They 
are inventors, geniuses with bad consciences, and this bad 
consciousness comes from the fact that mythological forms of knowledge, 
the question for certainty, for a secure foundation, for an authority, still 
count ideals of knowledge worth striving for…Hence we may think of 
theory as distinct from a myth. But it is presented as a myth. By way of a 
mistaken mathematical derivation physicists try to link it to the solid 
foundation of experience, and, in so doing, to justify it. The belief that this 
justification is successful leads to a highly dogmatic attitude, which 
identifies scientificity with Newtonianism, and which made it so difficult for 
Einstein to obtain acceptance for his own, completely different ideas. We 
can quite generally say that most physicists from 1700 until about 1920 
found themselves in a sort of schizophrenia: they did one thing, and they 
tried to persuade both the world and themselves that they were doing 
something completely different. They followed the tracks of the Ionians, 
they speculated, even if somewhat fearfully at times, but very often 
regardless of prejudices and even of experience. They tried to give the 
impression that, beginning with secure facts, they slowly built a solid 
system of thought that could, and should, be nothing other than a modern 
myth.9 
 
We see that in Feyerabend’s account of modern science, Bacon’s doctrine of 
idols not only has a place but also, and more importantly, is still needed in order 
to continue to advance the sciences. We see that the dogmatisms of the ancients 
have been replaced by scientific doctrines that are not less dogmatic. They may 
provide more fruits than the classical doctrines but this does not mean that they 
do not obstruct the continuation of the scientific project.  
 
 
                                            
1 OFB, XI, NO I.124 
2 Ibid. NO I.124 
3 Ibid. NO I.124 
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4 Ibid. NO I.129 
5 Kennington, p.29. This break between the ancient form of contemplation and the one Bacon 
introduces was apparent in our discussion of the idols.  
6 Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
p.240.  7"OFB,"XI,"NO%I.130.""
8 OFB, XI, NO I.129; NO II.1; NO II.4.  
9 Paul Feyerabend, Physics and Philosophy: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 4, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), p.216-7.  
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